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Fiscal Federalism as Risk-Sharing:
The Insurance Role of
Redistributive Taxation
JOHN R. BROOKS II*
I. INTRODUCTION
One major proposition of the fiscal federalism literature is that re-
distribution, and the closely related progressive income tax, should be
assigned exclusively to the most central level of government in a fed-
eral system, leaving subnational governments to focus on allocation of
public goods, funded with taxes tied closely to benefits.1  The rationale
for this proposition is straightforward:  Generous state-level redistri-
bution funded with high marginal tax rates has the potential to drive
away high-ability taxpayers and attract low-ability taxpayers.  Yet we
live in a world where there are substantial state-level redistributive
policies.2  Are states just getting it wrong?
* Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.  I am grateful to
Stefan Bird-Pollan, Stephen Cohen, Mihir Desai, Michael Doran, Peter Edelman, Brian
Galle, David Gamage, Michael Graetz, Itai Grinberg, Daniel Halperin, Edward Kleinbard,
Leandra Lederman, Benjamin Leff, Louis Kaplow, Jason Oh, Eloise Pasachoff, Alex
Raskolnikov, James Repetti, Diane Ring, David Schizer, Daniel Shaviro, Kirk Stark, Alvin
Warren, David Weisbach, Eric Zolt, and participants in workshops at UCLA School of
Law, Georgetown University Law Center, Boston College Law School, the Columbia Law
School–Hebrew University Tax Conference, and the Harvard Law School Seminar on
Current Research in Taxation for helpful conversations, comments, and suggestions.  I am
also especially grateful for the valuable research assistance of Yingchen Luo and Stephen
Richmond.
1 See Wallace E. Oates, Fiscal Federalism 14, 137-39 (Edward Elgar 2011) (1972) [here-
inafter Fiscal Federalism]; Richard A. Musgrave, The Theory of Public Finance:  A Study
in Public Economy 181 (1959); Robin Boadway & Jean-Franc¸ois Tremblay, Reassessment
of the Tiebout Model, 96 J. Pub. Econ. 1063, 1063-64 (2012); Wallace E. Oates, Toward a
Second-Generation Theory of Fiscal Federalism, 12 Int’l Tax & Pub. Fin. 349, 351-52 (2005)
[hereinafter Second Generation]; Kirk J. Stark, Fiscal Federalism and Tax Progressivity:
Should the Federal Income Tax Encourage State and Local Redistribution?, 51 UCLA L.
Rev. 1389, 1406-08 (2004); cf. Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures,
64 J. Pol. Econ. 416 (1956) (proposing that residents play a central role in determining the
optimal level of services offered by a municipality by moving to the community that best
matches their needs).
2 See Section III.A. Here, state redistribution also includes redistribution at the local
level.  See Clayton P. Gillette, Local Redistribution and Local Democracy:  Interest
Groups and the Court 53-71 (2011) (discussing the scope of local redistribution in the
United States).
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This Article takes a new look at the tax assignment question and
argues that the literature has largely misidentified the costs of state
redistributive tax-and-transfer systems.  The relevant costs, at least
within the range of plausible current policies, are not from tax migra-
tion and crippling state tax competition, but rather from poor risk
management—suboptimal insurance against income shocks, both for
states and their residents.  Thus states have some space to perform
redistribution, but insurance against low income should be addressed
nationally.  The problem is that the central tool for both redistribution
and income insurance is the same:  the progressive income tax.
A redistributive tax-and-transfer system, and a progressive income
tax in particular, not only funds the operations of government and
provides for income redistribution, but also acts as a form of insurance
against uncertain future income.  This aspect of a progressive income
tax is often forgotten in analyzing the tax, and that is particularly true
in the fiscal federalism literature.3  Because a progressive income tax
provides for relatively high taxes when incomes are high, and for low
taxes, exemptions, and transfers when incomes are low, it acts to re-
duce the volatility in annual after-tax income for taxpayers, and reduc-
ing volatility is the classic function of insurance.  Thus one can
distinguish the redistributive function of an income tax—redistrib-
uting income from those with high ability or endowment to those with
low ability or endowment—from the insurance function of an income
tax—a given taxpayer paying some premium today that is a function
of the expected value of potential transfers to her in the future.
In considering the question of where best to assign the progressive
income tax in a federal system, one can thus ask what levels of govern-
ment can best perform each of these two functions—redistribution
and insurance.  This Article suggests that the answer may be different
for each function.  Contrary to the classic fiscal federalism literature,
there are good reasons for some limited redistribution to be assigned
to the states.  This is not so for the insurance function, however.
First, regarding redistribution, theoretical work shows that relaxing
some of the assumptions in the early work of Richard Musgrave, Wal-
lace Oates, Charles Tiebout, and others leads to the result that redis-
tribution need not be exclusively federal.4  Furthermore, recent
empirical work shows that the risks of tax migration actually may be
quite limited, meaning that states may not pay a high economic cost
3 See, e.g., Lawrence Zelenak & Kemper Moreland, Can the Graduated Income Tax
Survive Optimal Tax Analysis?, 53 Tax L. Rev. 51, 56-57 (1999) (characterizing the view of
a progressive tax as insurance against uncertain labor income as one of “six situations that
have received little or no attention in the optimal tax literature”).
4 See Section IV.A.
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for implementing some limited redistribution.5  With the burdens on
state budgets increasing, as more and more social insurance and other
duties are devolved to the states, this is good news—news that the
fiscal federalism literature has not yet fully absorbed.
Second, regarding insurance, even if there is little potential for hurt-
ing economic output and state revenues due to tax migration, other
costs remain.  In particular, a state and its residents are exposed to
greater risk and volatility from a state progressive income tax.  At the
state government level, reliance on an income tax exposes a state to
greater revenue volatility, which can exacerbate the costs of an eco-
nomic downturn, as we have seen.  The volatility problem is well un-
derstood, and has prompted many calls for states to have better
counter-cyclical budget policy.6
A related cost, which has not previously been articulated in the
literature, is the risk to individual state residents.  Since a progressive
income tax is partly insurance against uncertain future income, insur-
ing at only the state level is simply not as efficient as insuring at the
federal level.  Because income shocks are often regionally correlated,
a regionally defined insurer—that is, a state—is less equipped to
smooth out income fluctuations than the federal government is.  By
pooling the risks of income shocks only at the state level, a state in-
come tax misses out on the actuarial benefits of national risk-pooling
present in a federal income tax.
The costs of such suboptimal insurance were displayed during the
Great Recession.  Following the 2008 financial crisis, state tax reve-
nues dropped dramatically,7 even while the demands on state social
insurance programs rose.8  This combination had a brutal effect on
state budgets, state residents, and the overall economy:  Nearly
750,000 state and local jobs were cut,9 state services shrank,10 schools
5 See Subsection IV.A.4.
6 See, e.g., Brian Galle & Kirk J. Stark, Beyond Bailouts:  Federal Tools for Preventing
State Budget Crises, 87 Ind. L.J. 599, 600 (2012); Brian Galle & Jonathan Klick, Recessions
and the Social Safety Net:  The Alternative Minimum Tax as a Countercyclical Fiscal Stabi-
lizer, 63 Stan. L. Rev. 187, 190 (2010); David Gamage, Preventing State Budget Crises:
Managing the Fiscal Volatility Problem, 98 Calif. L. Rev. 749, 758 (2010); Kirk J. Stark, The
Federal Role in State Tax Reform, 30 Va. Tax Rev. 407, 442 (2010); David A. Super, Re-
thinking Fiscal Federalism, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 2544, 2550 (2005).
7 E.g., Donald J. Boyd & Lucy Dadayan, State Tax Decline in Early 2009 Was the
Sharpest on Record, 76 St. Revenue Rep. (2009), available at http://www.rockinst.org/pdf/
government_finance/state_revenue_report/2009-07-17-SRR_76.pdf.
8 See Super, note 6, at 2630-32 (discussing the countercyclical nature of many state
programs).
9 Author’s calculations based on Federal Reserve Economic Data and Bureau of Labor
Statistics data.  See FRED Graph, Fed. Res. Bank of St. Louis Econ. Research, http://
research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/graph/ (graph of “CES9093000001,” and “CES9092000001”
data series); U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, http://www.bls.gov/data/; see
also David Cooper, Mary Gable & Algernon Austin, The Public-Sector Jobs Crisis 13
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increased class sizes and cut programs,11 and so on.  These effects not
only likely slowed U.S. economic growth12 but also had a profound
and lasting human cost.  And they can be traced largely to the risk-
shifting properties of an income tax, and the revenue volatility that
comes with that risk.13  Thus, there is a strong argument for assigning
the insurance function of a progressive income tax to the federal gov-
ernment, which is better able to absorb that risk.
Therefore, it may be appropriate, or at least predictable, for a state
to perform some of the redistributive function of taxation, but costly
for it to perform the insurance function.  Given that states use, and
likely always will use, redistributive programs such as a progressive
income tax, we should ask whether there are ways to limit those insur-
ance costs and thereby mitigate some of the painful revenue volatility
faced by states, due in part to their use of income taxes.
Because the costs of limited state-level progressive income taxation
are related to insurance, rather than redistribution, there is an obvious
way to mitigate those costs, at least theoretically:  reinsurance.  If it is
possible to reinsure the state-level risks of a progressive income tax at
the national level, then it would be possible in theory to have our cake
and eat (at least some of it) too.  We could have some state-level re-
distribution while still having largely national-level income insurance.
In particular, the most direct theoretical solution would be an actual
pooled reinsurance fund, also known as a multistate rainy-day fund
(RDF).14  A multistate RDF could pool the risks of state revenue vol-
atility and provide some of the national risk-pooling benefits of a fed-
eral income tax.  Many states already have their own independent
(Econ. Pol’y Inst., Briefing Paper No. 339, 2012), http://s3.epi.org/files/2012/bp339-public-
sector-jobs-crisis.pdf  (calculating 765,000 state and local government jobs lost during the
recession, based on Current Population Survey data).
10 See, e.g., Nicholas Johnson, Phil Oliff & Erica Williams, Ctr. on Budget & Pol’y Pri-
orities, An Update on State Budget Cuts:  At Least 46 States Have Imposed Cuts That
Hurt Vulnerable Residents and Cause Job Loss 1 (Feb. 9, 2011), http://www.cbpp.org/files/
3-13-08sfp.pdf.
11 See, e.g., id. at 10-12; Phil Oliff & Michael Leachman, Ctr. on Budget & Pol’y Priori-
ties, New School Year Brings Steep Cuts in State Funding for Schools 12–13 (Oct. 7, 2011),
http://www.cbpp.org/files/9-1-11sfp.pdf.
12 See, e.g., J. Bradford Delong & Lawrence H. Summers, Fiscal Policy in a Depressed
Economy, Brookings Papers on Econ. Activity, Spring 2012, at 234; Press Release, Fed.
Open Mkt. Comm. of Fed. Reserve 1 (May 1, 2013), available at http://www.federalreserve
.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20130501a.htm (stating that “fiscal policy is restraining ec-
onomic growth”).
13 See, e.g., Gary C. Cornia & Ray D. Nelson, State Tax Revenue Growth and Volatility,
6 Fed. Res. Bank of St. Louis Reg’l Econ. Dev. 23, 23-24 (2010), available at https://re-
search.stlouisfed.org/publications/red/2010/01/Cornia.pdf; Gamage, note 6, at 750; Russell
S. Sobel & Gary A. Wagner, Cyclical Variability in State Government Revenue:  Can Tax
Reform Reduce It?, 8 St. Tax Notes 569, 569 (Aug. 25, 2003); Stark, note 6, at 416-18.
14 See Gamage, note 6, at 766.
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RDFs,15 which are essentially a form of self-insurance.  The multistate
RDF would improve on these, much as pooled health or casualty in-
surance for individuals is superior to self-insurance.
There has been relatively little work addressing the theory and de-
sign of a multistate RDF.  What little work there is tends to be limited
to basic policy proposals cast as second-best options for managing
state fiscal volatility;16 here, by contrast, I argue that, properly con-
ceived, a multistate RDF would actually be part of an appropriate
risk-management system for the combined federal/state tax-and-trans-
fer system.
The legal literature tends to be dismissive of a multistate approach,
mostly due to the classic insurance problems of adverse selection17
and moral hazard.18  This Article suggests some design features to mit-
igate those problems.  In particular, a key insight of this Article is that
some moral hazard, in the form of increasing state reliance on income
taxes, is a less of a threat when a purpose of the RDF is precisely to
help support state-level redistribution.  In the social insurance context,
some moral hazard can be “good,” in the sense that the behavior be-
ing motivated, while costly, is ultimately desirable.19  Just as health
insurance coverage leads to more health care,20 state revenue insur-
ance could lead to more redistribution.  Therefore, moral hazard be-
comes less of a bug and more of a feature (though one that still
requires close management).
Given the practical and political problems with implementing a
multistate RDF, however, I also argue that a mix of existing programs
could be retooled or expanded to get some of the same benefits of a
multistate RDF.  Some combination of expanded state deficit spend-
ing, federal support for independent state RDFs, federal revenue
sharing that takes into account state revenue fluctuations and fiscal
15 Id.
16 See id. at 750; see also Akash Deep & Robert Lawrence, Stabilizing State and Local
Budgets:  A Proposal for Tax-Base Insurance 5-6 (Brookings Inst. Hamilton Project, Dis-
cussion Paper No. 2008-01, 2008), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/
files/papers/2008/6/tax%20base%20lawrence/06_tax_base_lawrence; Richard Mattoon,
Creating a National State Rainy Day Fund:  A Modest Proposal to Improve Future State
Fiscal Performance 119 (Fed. Res. Bank of Chicago, Working Paper No. 2003-20, 2003),
available at https://www.chicagofed.org/digital_assets/publications/working_papers/2003/
wp2003-20.pdf.
17 See, e.g., Galle & Stark, note 6, at 619 (arguing that states may not participate in a
shared-pool arrangement because the benefits promised for their contributions are not
recouped until some point in the unknown future); Gamage, note 6, at 767 (discussing the
lack of incentive to participate during strong economic times)
18 See, e.g., Galle & Stark, note 6, at 618.
19 See John A. Nyman, Health Insurance Theory:  The Case of the Missing Welfare
Gain, 9 Eur. J. Health Econ. 369, 378-80 (2008).
20 Id. at 371-72.
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capacities, and a more explicit and defined federal bail-out role could
provide risk-sharing similar to a multistate RDF.  Viewed in this way,
these programs are not independent responses to independent
problems, but rather parts of a combined federal/state risk-manage-
ment strategy.
Therefore, an important conclusion of this Article is that incorpora-
tion of the insurance function of taxation illuminates the degree to
which risks can and should be shared and spread throughout a federal
system.  While much of the fiscal federalism literature is concerned
with divvying up tasks among different, and often competing, layers of
government,21 this Article instead views the combined federal/state
tax-and-transfer system as a coherent whole, and asks how such a sys-
tem can operate more effectively.
This Article proceeds as follows.  Part II explains the insurance role
of an income tax, in order to flesh out the key analytical tool used in
this Article.  Part III briefly discusses some features of state tax and
budget policy, particularly the role of income taxes and budget rules
that limit the ability of states to carry deficits.  Part IV reviews the
theoretical and empirical literature on fiscal federalism, to challenge
the idea that redistribution should be exclusively handled by the fed-
eral government.  This Part also explains the insurance-related costs of
state income taxes:  revenue volatility and actuarial inefficiency.  Part
V discusses potential options for national reinsurance of some state
risks as a way to achieve the normative benefits of state-level redistri-
bution while mitigating the insurance costs outlined in Part IV, look-
ing in particular at the arguments for a multistate rainy-day fund.  Part
VI concludes.
II. REDISTRIBUTIVE TAXATION AS SOCIAL INSURANCE
A. The Tax-and-Transfer System Generally
If differences in ability to pay were purely a function of ex ante
endowments, whether personal or financial, then any deviation from
pure benefit taxation—taxing each individual based on the value he
receives from government—would be redistributive.22  But of course
21 See, e.g., Musgrave, note 1, at 5-6; Oates, Fiscal Federalism, note 1, at xvii.
22 This is in relation to pretax market outcomes.  But using those outcomes as a baseline
is problematic, given that we hardly have purely competitive markets and the markets we
have depend heavily on a functioning government to operate.  Much of what appears to be
pretax income is already a function of government action.  See Liam Murphy & Thomas
Nagel, The Myth of Ownership:  Taxes and Justice 8 (2002).  A better baseline might be the
pretax income distribution assuming the same level of government expenditures, but
funded out of lump sum, and therefore nondistortionary, taxes.  But that is a very hypo-
thetical baseline, and so provides little analytical help. See Louis Kaplow, Taxation and
Redistribution:  Some Clarifications, 60 Tax L. Rev. 57, 64-65 (2007).
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actual outcomes vary for many reasons beyond ex ante endowments,
even assuming comparable amounts of effort.  Thus two people with
the same ex ante endowments—identical twins who attend the same
schools, say—might still end up with very different ex post abilities to
pay.
Some of the difference might be explained based on educational or
career choices or the like,23 but some of the difference would be based
simply on luck—who had an easy grader in college, who had a supe-
rior retire early, leading to an early promotion, who was hit by a bus,
who had bad weather destroy a crop, and similar events.  Indeed,
some studies imply that luck plays a central role in explaining income
variations; once all the usual factors, such as family background, edu-
cation, cognitive ability, and the like,24 are accounted for, a large
amount of variation still remains.25
Despite the importance of luck, many analyses and models of the
effects of redistributive taxation do not account for this uncertainty.
In the optimal tax literature, for example, models tend to either ignore
uncertainty or assume that private markets are complete in providing
insurance, and that therefore any observed risk is a function of the
risk preferences of the individual, and not simply bad luck.26  But this
assumption is, of course, profoundly unrealistic.
First, even if it were possible to identify and estimate the likelihood
of every possible event that might affect labor income, private insur-
ance simply might not be available.  The classic reasons given for pri-
23 See Hal R. Varian, Redistributive Taxation as Social Insurance, 14 J. Pub. Econ. 49,
49-50 (1980) (citing Christopher Jencks, Inequality (1972)); see also Robert Gibbons &
Lawrence Katz, Does Unmeasured Ability Explain Inter-Industry Wage Differentials?, 59
Rev. Econ. Stud. 515, 517 (1992) (arguing that ability does not explain all inter-industry
wage differentials).
24 Of course, the distribution of endowments and abilities is itself also a lottery, and one
can think of redistributive taxation as also being partly insurance against bad outcomes in
that lottery.  See notes 42-45 and accompanying text; Ronald Dworkin, What Is Equality?
Part 2:  Equality of Resources, 10 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 283, 302 (1981).  But the point is that
even after accounting for many of the factors that are known to contribute to income and
wealth, a large degree of variation remains.
25 See Varian, note 23, at 49-52 (summarizing research on the causes of income
inequality).
26 See David A. Moss, When All Else Fails:  Government as the Ultimate Risk Manager
35 (2002) (“Standard economic models actually envision a world of complete contingent
markets, where any risk—no matter how small or unusual—can be bought and sold in the
marketplace.”); Varian, note 23, at 50; Zelenak & Moreland, note 3; see also Alan J.
Auerbach & James R. Hines Jr., Taxation and Economic Efficiency, in 3 Handbook of
Public Economics 1362 n.8 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds., 2002) (providing an
overview of optimal tax theory that explicitly assumes that markets for risk-sharing are
complete).  But see Louis Kaplow, A Note on Taxation as Social Insurance for Uncertain
Labor Income 49 Pub. Fin. 244, 245 (1994) (discussing some optimal tax work that incorpo-
rates the insurance role).
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vate insurance market failure are moral hazard27 and adverse
selection,28 but these may not be totally satisfactory to address why
public, social insurance is an improvement.29  More satisfactory rea-
sons for social insurance include the relative inability of individuals to
estimate risk,30 the inability of private insurers to fully commit to cov-
ering insured events,31 and externalization of costs associated with
risk.32  Thus, even in a world with perfect information about risk and
behavior—and therefore without the problems of adverse selection
and moral hazard—one would still expect to see some failure in the
private market for insurance against uncertain income.
Second, even complete markets for risk cannot fully insure against
uncertainty.  The notion of “risk” captures events whose outcomes are
unknown, but for which we know the probability distribution of possi-
ble outcomes.  “Uncertainty,” on the other hand, captures events for
27 See Jonathan Eaton & Harvey S. Rosen, Optimal Redistributive Taxation and Uncer-
tainty, 95 Q.J. Econ. 357, 357 (1980); Varian, note 23, at 5.
28 See George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”:  Quality Uncertainty and the
Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. Econ. 488, 492-94 (1970); Robin Boadway, Manuel Leite-
Monteiro, Maurice Marchand & Pierre Pestieau, Social Insurance and Redistribution with
Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection, 108 Scand. J. Econ. 279, 280, 296 (2006); Agnar
Sandmo, Introduction:  The Welfare Economics of the Welfare State, 97 Scand. J. Econ.
469, 472 (1995).
29 Kaplow disputes the argument that the lack of private insurance due to moral hazard
means that government ought to provide social insurance through taxation.  First, the gov-
ernment is no more immune to moral hazard than private insurers, and if, in fact, it turns
out to be optimal for the government to provide social insurance, the same should be true
for private insurers.  Second, it may be less efficient for the government to provide social
insurance through taxation than to just provide insurance directly, since the tax system
externalizes the cost of the insurance, potentially leading to over-insurance by individuals.
Kaplow, note 26, at 246; see also Sandmo, note 28, at 473.  John Nyman, however, points
out that what is considered “moral hazard” in the social insurance context includes wel-
fare-enhancing acts, such as the provision of health care.  This sort of “efficient” moral
hazard might still lead to a failure of private insurance markets, even though the provision
of the insurance would be efficient.  In other words, some normative and redistributive
goals might explain the government’s particular interest in providing social insurance, even
though the government exposes itself to the costs of moral hazard.  See Nyman, note 19, at
378-80.
30 For example, if workers consistently overestimate their future income or underesti-
mate their risk of an event that could take them out of the labor market.  See Moss, note
26, at 40-45.
31 For example, insuring against low income is a massive undertaking, and it would be
difficult to trust a private entity to be able to cover losses in a worst-case scenario.  Gov-
ernment, on the other hand, has sufficient capital to cover worst-case losses and further-
more has the ability to shift risks across generations.  See id. at 45-48.
32 For example, an individual concerned about low income probably is not internalizing
the additional social costs of his being underemployed, such as the effects on others of
living in a neighborhood with high poverty.  See id. at 48-49; see also Patrick Sharkey,
Stuck in Place:  Urban Neighborhoods and the End of Progress Toward Racial Equality
105-07 (2012) (discussing the connection between racially segregated communities with
persistent high poverty, and the costs of living in a community with high poverty even for
those with relatively high income).
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which we do not even know the possible outcomes or their likeli-
hoods.33  Uncertain—as opposed to risky—events are particularly
hard to insure against, because an insurer has no way even to estimate
the likelihood of a bad outcome.34
Thus, there is a relatively strong case for at least a partially public
role in insuring against the risk of uncertain labor income—private
markets are unlikely to be able to play a role, and even if they could,
they would be inadequate.  This is, in essence, the argument behind
almost all of our public social insurance programs such as unemploy-
ment insurance, disability insurance, health insurance, and Social Se-
curity.35  However, the case for social insurance also partly explains
the redistributive tax-and-transfer system in general, and the progres-
sive income tax in particular.
A redistributive tax-and-transfer system partially insures against un-
certain labor income by allowing individuals to pay some amount of
money today in exchange for paying less money and receiving benefits
in the future should income fall below a certain level.  The system
effectively narrows the range—reduces the variance—of possible af-
ter-tax income compared to, say, a lump sum tax that raised the same
revenue.  If an individual turns out to have high pretax income, her
33 See, e.g., Frank H. Knight, Risk, Uncertainty and Profit 230-32 (1920).  As Donald
Rumsfeld would say, this is the distinction between “known unknowns” and “unknown
unknowns.”  U.S. Dep’t of Defense, DOD News Briefing—Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen.
Myers (Feb. 12, 2002), http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=
2636.
34 Ronald Dworkin makes a similar distinction, between “option luck”—the result of
“deliberate and calculated gambles”—and “brute luck”—essentially, other uncertain
events that are not a result of gambles.  Dworkin, note 24, at 293.  As Dworkin acknowl-
edges, the distinction between the two is not clean—in a sense just about everything one
does is a calculated gamble, even if only the gamble that one will not be struck by lightning
or hit by a meteorite.  Id. (“Obviously the difference between these two forms of luck can
be represented as a matter of degree, and we may be uncertain how to describe a particular
piece of bad luck.”).  But with this distinction, one can see that even insured events cannot
be assumed away in considering the effects of luck.  Thus, I might purchase health insur-
ance, which in part insures against the effects of being hit by a meteorite.  But if I am
struck by a meteorite, I have still suffered from brute bad luck even if it is partly counter-
balanced by my “good” option luck in gambling that I might need health care in the future.
I am worse off than if I had only suffered the “bad” option luck of purchasing health
insurance and not been struck by a meteorite.  See id.  Thus, even under the unrealistic
assumption that insurance markets are perfect, the effects of uncertain events and brute
bad luck cannot be ignored in considering the ultimate distribution of market resources.
Even under the strongest possible assumptions about the availability of private insurance,
bad luck still hurts.  See Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 Tex. L. Rev.
237, 278 (1996) (noting that insurance recovery cannot fully compensate for all losses).
35 See Michael J. Graetz & Jerry L. Mashaw, True Security:  Rethinking American So-
cial Insurance 17-23 (1999) (discussing economic and normative reasons for government
social insurance against low labor income); Moss, note 26, at 49-52 (discussing govern-
ment’s superior ability to overcome information, perception, commitment, and externaliza-
tion problems).
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after-tax income will be somewhat less; if she turns out to have low
pretax income, her after-tax (and after-transfer) income will be some-
what more.36  Reducing the variance of possible outcomes is precisely
what insurance does, by shifting that risk onto an insurer and thereby
spreading it among all the insured.
To see this another way, ignore the insurance function for a mo-
ment.  Consider the tax payment of a high-earning individual to con-
tain two components:  One component of the tax is the value of the
benefits received from government services—a price, essentially—and
the remaining component is redistributive—it goes to pay for income
support and other benefits for low-earning individuals.37  (And a low-
earning person would receive a net redistributive transfer, since their
tax would be less than the value of benefits received.)  Reintroducing
the insurance element adds a third component to the tax payments,
the “premium” for the income insurance provided to the taxpayer
herself.38  (Or it might be considered as an additional part of the “ben-
efit” component, shrinking the “redistributive” component corre-
spondingly.)  Thus, some amount of the tax, above and beyond a full
accounting of all other benefits received, acts as sort of insurance pre-
mium, and therefore pays for an additional benefit that accrues to the
taxpayer.  As a matter of cash flows, some of that premium will go out
in the form of payments and benefits to those with low income.  But
that is no different from any insurance program.39  If my homeowners’
insurance premium funds a payment to another insured whose house
burned down, that is not “redistribution”—that is just luck.40
36 See Kaplow, note 28, at 60-62.
37 This essentially mirrors Richard Musgrave’s division of government into the Alloca-
tion Branch and the Distribution Branch (Musgrave also includes the Stabilization Branch,
which I can ignore here).  See Musgrave, note 1, at 5-6.  Separating the roles would be
difficult in practice, of course, particularly because the high-earning individual also gets
direct and indirect benefits from redistribution (not including the insurance benefit).  For
example, the person might prefer to live in a more equal society, might take altruistic
benefit in helping those in need, or might get particular economic benefits from living in a
society with a stable class of consumers.  Moreover, the value of many of the public goods
provided by government, such as national defense, rule of law, and property rights, argua-
bly accrue more to those with more wealth to protect.  See Boris Bittker, The Income Tax:
How Progressive Should It Be? 48-54 (1969) (arguing that the benefits of government in-
crease in proportion to income and wealth).
38 The insurance metaphor can be extended beyond the idea of a “premium.”  Because
the value of lower taxes and higher transfers may not fully make up for the downside risk
of uncertain income, there is also a degree of “coinsurance.”  Similarly, one could imagine
the amount of lost income needed for transfers to kick in, or even to drop a tax bracket, as
a partial “deductible.”  See Kaplow, note 26, at 245 n.7.
39 See Dworkin, note 24, at 296-97.
40 To be more precise, I mean that the transfer is actuarially fair and not based on
broader social policy goals.
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In practice, however, disentangling the redistributive and insurance
elements is impossible, and there is room for significant disagreement
over definitions.41  For example, the distribution of endowments and
abilities is itself a lottery, and we can think of redistributive taxation
as also being partly insurance against bad outcomes in that lottery.42
Thus redistribution itself could be conceived as endowment insurance
from Rawls’ original position.43  Rawls himself argued that the choice
of his two principles of justice in the original position could be based
entirely on self-interest.44  If so, then in part the question of where to
draw the line between redistribution and insurance may be one of tim-
ing.  From any given point in life, transfers based on ex ante factors
may look like redistribution, and transfers based on uncertain ex post
factors may look more like insurance.
But even from the original position, an individual choosing a redis-
tributive tax-and-transfer system may not be solely insuring himself.
Indeed, some commentators on Rawls say that he was incorrect in
arguing that no external normative values are required to deduce the
principles of justice in the original position, and that in fact some intu-
itive idea of “fairness” must play a role in his logic.45  Thus some of
the choice, even in the original position, may simply be a normative or
aesthetic preference for a more egalitarian society.  Even in the earli-
41 See, e.g., Edward D. Kleinbard, We Are Better Than This:  How Government Should
Spend Our Money 327-33 (2015) (arguing that much social insurance is misidentified as
redistribution).
42 See, e.g., Dworkin, note 24, at 302.
43 On the original position, see John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 118-83 (1971); John F.
Rawls, Fairness as Justice:  A Restatement 15 (2001) [hereinafter Restatement]:
In the original position, the parties are not allowed to know the social positions
or the particular comprehensive doctrines of the persons they represent.  They
also do not know persons’ race and ethnic group, sex, or various native endow-
ments such as strength or intelligence, all within the normal range.  We express
these limits on information figuratively by saying the parties are behind a veil
of ignorance.
44 Rawls, Restatement, note 43, at 85 (“[T]he parties [in the original position] take no
direct interest in the interests of persons represented by other parties.”); see also Brian
Barry, Theories of Justice 213-14 (1989) (“[T]he difference principle is said to be what
mutually disinterested people choosing principles to advance their own interests from be-
hind a veil of ignorance would agree in choosing.”).
45 See Barry, note 44, at 214 (“No other aspect of Rawls’s theory has attracted more
commentary . . . and it is, I think, safe to say that no other aspect of the theory has met with
such uniform rejection.”), 334-37 (“[T]here is simply no way in which [Rawls] can adapt an
original position with self-interested choices so as to get it to reflect his basic moral com-
mitments. . . . It seems clear that Rawls has hit upon a method whereby you can get any-
thing out of the theory at the end by simply putting it in at the beginning.”); Thomas Nagel,
Rawls on Justice, in Reading Rawls:  Critical Studies on Rawls’ A Theory of Justice 1, 15
(Norman Daniels ed., Stanford Univ. Press 1989) (1975) (“The egalitarian liberalism which
[Rawls] develops and the conception of the good on which it depends are extremely per-
suasive, but the original position serves to model rather than to justify them.”).
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est theoretical time period, then, we can imagine that only part of the
choice is self-regarding, while another part is explicitly redistributive.
The distinction between redistribution and insurance is further
clouded because, just as a redistributive tax-and-transfer system is
partly social insurance, social insurance is partly redistributive.  For
private insurance to operate effectively, it needs to manage the
problems of adverse selection and moral hazard.  With regard to ad-
verse selection in particular, without some form of experience rating,46
an insurance scheme can end up being a net transfer from those with
low risk to those with high risk.47  Low-risk individuals generally
would not like that deal and might opt out.  In the tax system, how-
ever, opting out is not generally available, and thus we end up with
some subsidization of those with a higher risk of low labor income by
those with a lower risk.  Therefore social insurance like this almost
always contains a redistributive element.48  This feedback loop—redis-
tributive programs having insurance value, insurance programs having
redistributive value—makes disentangling the two practically impossi-
ble.  Nonetheless, the insurance function exists, and thus what appears
to be the redistributive function of a tax-and-transfer system is actu-
ally partly redistribution and partly insurance.49
Looking at the tax-and-transfer system as in part a form of insur-
ance, not just redistribution, affects the analysis of certain tax policy
questions.  For example, the results from optimal tax theory models
differ substantially based in part on whether they include the element
of uncertainty of income.  The standard view is that a lump sum tax-
46 “Experience rating” describes the methods by which insurers price premiums based in
part on the particular risks of the individual being insured.  See, e.g., Mark V. Pauly, The
Welfare Economics of Community Rating, 37 J. Risk & Ins. 407, 408 (1970).  It is in con-
trast to “community rating,” whereby all insureds in a group are charged the same pre-
mium based on the aggregate risk of the group.  See, e.g., id. at 407.
47 See id. at 410-11.
48 See Graetz & Mashaw, note 35, at 22; Boadway et al., note 28, at 280, 295; Jean-
Charles Rochet, Incentives, Redistribution and Social Insurance, 16 Geneva Papers on
Risk & Ins. Theory 143, 145, 149 (1991).
49 Indeed, a recent paper by Hilary Hoynes and Erzo Luttmer claims that the insurance
value of state tax-and-transfer systems is actually quite high, and rising with income, which
can partly explain why support for progressive taxation is also relatively high.  They define
as insurance those potential future transfers that are based on the uncertainty of future
income; thus their determination of insurance is done at a certain point in time, looking
toward the future.  As they acknowledge, they likely overestimate the insurance value for
high-income individuals.  In addition, they do not include any savings, and thus do not
account for self-insurance in measuring individual utility from potential transfers.  Hilary
W. Hoynes & Erzo F.P. Luttmer, The Insurance Value of State Tax-and-Transfer Pro-
grams, 95 J. Pub. Econ. 1466, 1467 (2011); see also Varian, note 23, at 62-63.; cf. Richard
Blundell, Luigi Pistaferri & Ian Preston, Consumption Inequality and Partial Insurance, 98
Am. Econ. Rev. 1887, 1887-89 (2008) (examining the insurance of tax-and-transfer policies
with a parametric income generation model that allows for self-insurance through savings).
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and-transfer system is efficient and generates no excess burden, ignor-
ing any desire for equity.50  However, introducing uncertainty in labor
income changes the result such that lump sum taxes may no longer be
efficient, even, again, ignoring any desire for redistribution.51  As is
discussed in Part IV, the distinction between redistribution and insur-
ance also bears on the question of how to assign tax functions in a
federal system.
B. Progressive Income Taxation
The prior discussion explains the insurance function of a redistribu-
tive tax-and-transfer system in general, and therefore applies to many
of the programs explicitly categorized as social insurance, such as
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), Supplemental Nu-
trition Assistance Program (SNAP), Medicaid, and Social Security.52
There should be little surprise that these transfers have an insurance
function.
But the same argument for insurance value also applies when look-
ing more narrowly just at tax instruments, separate from the classic
social insurance programs.  Thus, an income tax itself has an insurance
function, by charging more when times are good and less when times
are bad—this also acts to lower the variance in after-tax income.  That
is true for a flat-rate income tax,53 but it applies even more so to a
progressive income tax, with graduated rates, exemptions, and even
tax-based transfers, such as an earned income tax credit (EITC).54
Graduated rates and EITCs are not typically thought of as providing
insurance,55 but by helping to narrow the range of possible future out-
50 See, e.g., Harvey R. Rosen & Ted Gayer, Public Finance 330-33 (9th ed. 2010).
51 See Jonathan Eaton & Harvey S. Rosen, Labor Supply, Uncertainty, and Efficient
Taxation, 14 J. Pub. Econ. 365, 373 (1980) (showing that under certain assumptions the
optimal wage tax rate is strictly greater than zero).
52 This is not to say that any of these programs functions well as social insurance.  TANF
in particular has low benefit rates and participation.  See David A. Super, The Quiet “Wel-
fare” Revolution:  Resurrecting the Food Stamp Program in the Wake of the 1996 Welfare
Law, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1271, 1309-11 (2004).  Nonetheless, the intent of TANF and the
other programs is to provide additional support in cases of low income.  Id. at 1391.
53 And would also be a true for a property tax or sales tax or other tax instrument that
charges more in good times than bad.
54 This is assuming that the transfer side of the equation would not be greatly altered by
the political economy of a hypothetical move from a flat-rate income tax (or even a lump
sum tax) to a more progressive income tax.  It could be, however, that transfers become
relatively less progressive to make up for a more progressive tax system, in which case
there would be no net difference.  This seems unlikely, however, and the generally ac-
cepted view is that a progressive income tax is a major source of redistribution.  See note
49.
55 But see Graetz & Mashaw, note 35, at 48-54 (describing the EITC as a social insur-
ance program, though an imperfect one because, as a wage subsidy, it does not protect
those completely out of the work force).
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comes, they provide a form of insurance against uncertain labor in-
come just as the classic social insurance programs do.
This Article focuses in particular on the progressive income tax for
the following reasons.  First, because the Article is concerned with fis-
cal federalism, and the tax assignment question in particular, it is nec-
essary to focus on particular tax instruments, rather than the “tax-and-
transfer system” generally.  Only by narrowing in on particular instru-
ments can we begin to discuss what level(s) of government ought to
use those instruments.
Second, the progressive income tax is arguably our most powerful
redistributive tool,56 at least from a pretax income baseline.57  As dis-
cussed in Part IV, there is active debate in the fiscal federalism litera-
ture about what level of government can best perform the
redistributive function, and this bears directly on the question of
whether and to what degree a state can effectively use an income tax.
Third, of the major tax instruments—income, sales, property, and
wealth-transfer taxes—the income tax also has the largest insurance
function.58  The focus here is on insurance against uncertain future
income, and a tax that uses an income baseline can be most closely
targeted to changes in income.  And this insurance function, as this
Article argues, is what complicates the fiscal federalism question in
important ways.
III. STATE TAX OVERVIEW
This Article is concerned with aspects of state tax and budget policy
in a federal system, and so I briefly review some of the relevant fea-
tures here.  Readers familiar with these features may wish to skip to
Part IV.  State fiscal systems are, of course, enormously complicated
and diverse, and so this is by necessity just an overview.59  Below, I
address three key areas of state fiscal systems.  In Section A, I discuss
state tax mixes, and the role of state income taxes in particular.  In
Section B, I discuss the collection of institutional rules that govern
state tax and budget policy, particularly those rules that ostensibly
56 See Ronald McKinnon & Thomas Nechyba, Competition in Federal Systems:  The
Role of Political and Financial Constraints, in The New Federalism:  Can the States Be
Trusted?  3, 51-52 (John A. Ferejohn & Barry R. Weingast eds., 1997) (noting the particular
importance of a progressive income tax to redistribution policy).
57 Though this baseline is problematic.  See note 22.
58 See Louis Kaplow, Taxation and Risk Taking:  A General Equilibrium Perspective, 47
Nat’l Tax J. 789, 795-96 (1994).
59 For more detail on state tax and budget policies, see generally The Oxford Handbook
of State and Local Government Finance (Robert D. Ebel & John E. Petersen eds., 2012)
[hereinafter Oxford Handbook]; see also Gamage, note 6, at 754-65; Super, note 6, at 2605-
40.
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limit state borrowing and deficit spending.  In Section C, I note some
of the examples of state spending on redistributive programs.
A. State Income Taxes
In general, states (and their localities) rely on a mix of property,
income (both individual and corporate), and sales and use taxes, mis-
cellaneous fees and charges, and federal transfers to fund their opera-
tions.  The property tax is the largest component of the tax mix,
generating $443.3 billion in state and local revenue, or about 33.1% of
own-source revenue, in 2011.60  General use sales taxes tend to be the
second largest, though individual income taxes are a close third, some-
times surpassing sales taxes.61  In 2011, general use sales taxes and
individual income taxes made up 22.9% and 21.2% of state own-
source revenue, respectively.62
That said, there is substantial variation among the states in their
relative reliance on income taxes.  Most prominently, nine states have
little or no income tax.  Alaska, Florida, Nevada, South Dakota,
Texas, Washington, and Wyoming have no state income tax, and New
Hampshire and Tennessee have an income tax only on interest and
dividend income.63  Of the forty-one states with a full income tax,
northeastern states tend to rely more heavily on income taxes com-
pared to a sales tax, while those in the southeast and southwest tend
to rely more heavily on sales taxes.64  That trend is partially explained
by some of the relatively large states with policies that swing in one
direction or the other.  For example, New York and Massachusetts
rely much more on income taxes compared to sales taxes, while Texas
and Florida lack an income tax entirely.65
Every state’s income tax should be considered progressive, even
where the rates are flat, and even before taking into account the trans-
fer side of the equation.  This is because, first, every state with an in-
come tax includes some sort of exemption or standard deduction,66
60 See Urban-Brookings Tax Pol’y Ctr., State and Local General Revenue 2004-2011, at
1 (Sept. 20, 2013), http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxfacts/Content/PDF/dqs_table_64.pdf.
61 Id.  In 2008, for example, individual income taxes generated $304.9 billion, while gen-
eral use sales taxes generated $304.7 billion.  Id. at 4.
62 Id. at 1.
63 Id.; Joseph J. Cordes & Jason N. Juffras, State Personal Income Taxes, in Oxford
Handbook, note 59, at 300, 301.
64 See Urban-Brookings Tax Pol’y Ctr., note 60, at 1.
65 See Cordes & Juffras, note 63, at 301.
66 Arguably Pennsylvania is an exception, since it has a flat rate structure with no ex-
emptions or standard deduction.  See Pa. Const. art. VIII, § 1; Pa. Dep’t of Rev., Personal
Income Tax Guide ch. 6, at 7 (May 15, 2012), http://www.revenue.pa.gov/FormsandPublica-
tions/PAPersonalIncomeTaxGuide/Documents/pitguide_chapter_06.pdf; Urban-Brookings
Tax Pol’y Ctr., Individual State Income Tax Rates 2000-2014, at 1 (May 28, 2014), http://
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meaning that average tax rates are increasing, even if marginal rates
are flat.  Furthermore, twenty-four states and the District of Columbia
provide an EITC, on top of the federal EITC, refundable in all but
three states.67  This provides essentially a negative income tax rate at
the low end of the rate schedule.68
The degree of rate graduation varies between the states, however.
Seven states have single-rate income taxes.69  Of those with graduated
rates, the top rates vary from 3.22% (North Dakota, for income above
$398,350)70 to 13.3% (California, for income above $1 million).71
After a period of flattening in the 1980’s and 1990’s, presumably
mirroring the trend in federal tax rates, states have been increasing
the graduation of their income tax rates since 2008.72  The timing sug-
gests that this was in large part due to revenue needs created by the
2008 financial crisis and subsequent recession, and a few states that
increased top rates during that period either have rolled the top rate
back73 or are scheduled to do so.74  That said, some analysts believe
that states do not have much room to cut rates further and may be
forced to raise them.  An aging population will likely lead to a relative
shrinking of the tax base,75 which means that rates must go up to keep
www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxfacts/Content/PDF/state_income_rates.pdf.  However, Penn-
sylvania does have a “Tax Forgiveness” program that provides a credit against tax for low-
income taxpayers, thus operating much like a zero bracket for low-income taxpayers.  See
72 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 7304 (West 2013); Pa. Dep’t of Rev., Tax Forgiveness, http://www.reve-
nue.pa.gov/GeneralTaxInformation/Tax%20Types%20and%20Information/Pages/Per-
sonal%20Income%20Tax/Tax%20Forgiveness/Tax%20Forgiveness.aspx (last visited Nov.
3, 2014).
67 See Urban-Brookings Tax Pol’y Ctr., State Earned Income Tax Credits Based on the
Federal EITC 1 (Aug. 13, 2013), http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxfacts/Content/PDF/
state_eitc.pdf.
68 See David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and Spending Pro-
grams, 113 Yale L.J. 955, 1026 (2004).
69 Urban-Brookings Tax Pol’y Ctr., note 66, at 1 (Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, Massachu-
setts, Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Utah).
70 N.D. Cent. Code Ann. § 57-38-30.3 (West).
71 Urban-Brookings Tax Pol’y Ctr., note 66, at 1.  California’s top bracket is 12.3%, but
there is an additional 1% surtax on incomes over $1 million.  Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code
§ 17041 (West 2014) (setting the 2009 tax rate schedule and providing for annual adjust-
ments based on the California Consumer Price Index); State of Calif. Franchise Tax Bd.,
2014 California Tax Rates and Exemptions, https://www.ftb.ca.gov/forms/2014_Califor-
nia_Tax_Rates_and_Exemptions.shtml (last visited Nov. 3, 2014) (adjusting the tax brack-
ets for the annual change in inflation).
72 See Cordes & Juffras, note 63, at 309-11.
73 In 2009 New Jersey’s top rate increased from 8.97% to 10.75%, but in 2010 the rate
reverted back to 8.97%.  Oregon’s top rate went from 11% to 9.9% in 2011.  Urban-Brook-
ings Tax Pol’y Ctr., note 66, at 4.
74 Hawaii’s top rate is scheduled to go from 11% to 8.25% in 2015.  See Cordes & Juf-
fras, note 63, at 310.
75 The tax base shrinks with an aging population because, first, average income falls with
age, and, second, income for the elderly is disproportionately made up of tax-preferred
items, such as dividends, capital gains, pensions, and Social Security.  See id. at 316.
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per capita revenue constant.76  And after the axe taken to state budg-
ets during the Great Recession, including deferral of spending, there
is little room for revenue to drop further.
B. Fiscal Institutions
There are several key types of institutional rules, sometimes called
“fiscal constitutions,”77 governing the administration of state taxes
and expenditures.  Particularly important for this discussion are bal-
anced budget requirements, tax and expenditure limitations, and
rainy-day funds.
1. Balanced Budget Requirements and Debt Limitations
Every state except Vermont has some sort of balanced budget re-
quirement, either by constitution or statute.  The rules vary in
strength.  Some require only that budgets be balanced as enacted, but
do not prohibit the state from having a deficit and carrying a debt in
fact.78  Most apply only to operating budgets and general funds, thus
freeing a state to fund capital projects or pension funds with debt.
Furthermore, enforcement provisions are generally weak or not
invoked.79
More powerful than actual rules, however, may be the combination
of bond markets, voters, and custom.  The actual rules apply to less
than 75% of state spending,80 but states typically balance their budg-
ets to a far greater degree,81 implying that they are not merely obeying
the legal minimum.
Related to balanced budget requirements are debt rules that limit
the amount of debt a state can carry, either as a fixed amount or as a
percentage of the state budget.  Both the budget and debt rules gener-
ally arose out of a state debt crisis in the 1840’s.  States had run up
enormous debts in the early 1800’s to help fund railroads and the like,
76 See id. at 310, 316-17.
77 See Super, note 6, at 2549 n.21.
78 See Tracy M. Gordon, State and Local Fiscal Institutions in Recession and Recovery,
in Oxford Handbook, note 59, at 246, 249.
79 See id.
80 James M. Poterba, Balanced Budget Rules and Fiscal Policy:  Evidence from the
States, 48 Nat’l Tax J. 329, 331 (1995).
81 See Urban-Brookings Tax Pol’y Ctr., State and Local Government Revenues and Ex-
penditures, Per Capita, by Function, Selected Years 1977-2011 (Sept. 20, 2013), http://www
.taxpolicycenter.org/taxfacts/Content/PDF/dqs_table_49.pdf (showing close alignment be-
tween revenues and expenditures over time); see also Yilin Hou & Daniel L. Smith, Do
State Balanced Budget Requirements Matter?  Testing Two Explanatory Frameworks, 145
Pub. Choice 57, 63-64 (2009) (noting little connection between legal stringency and fiscal
behavior).
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but after the financial panic of 1837 and the recession that followed, a
number of states defaulted on their debts.82  Following the debacle,
states found that they needed hard limits on borrowing in order to
attract lenders again.  States that entered the union after this period
have followed the lead of the older states.83
Currently, forty-six states have constitutional or statutory limita-
tions on total debt outstanding, and many also have procedural limita-
tions, such as supermajority or voter approval requirements.84  Many
of these limitations also extend to local borrowing, though some writ-
ers have suggested that one reason for the growth in special-purpose
entities, such as water and sewer districts, is to get around these
limitations.85
2. Tax and Expenditure Limits
In addition to limits on spending in excess of revenue, some states
have rules restricting how revenue or expenditures can grow.  For ex-
ample, Proposition 13 in California limits the growth in property tax
assessed values to no more than 2% per year unless the property is
sold.86  Massachusetts similarly limits growth in property tax rates.87
Other states have “taxpayer bills of rights,” which provide rules for,
among other things, voter approval of tax increases.88
3. Rainy-Day Funds
RDFs, also known as budget stabilization funds, are a relatively re-
cent innovation in state budget policy, dating largely to the 1980’s
(though some date as far back as the 1940’s).89  Their growth in recent
years can be partly explained by the increase in state revenue volatil-
ity during the 1980’s,90 as a result of the relative shift toward income
82 See Gordon, note 78, at 251 (“[E]ight states and the Territory of Florida defaulted,
five states repudiated all or part of their debts, two states renegotiated with creditors, and
two states delayed by ultimately repaid their obligations.”).
83 Id.
84 Id. at 251-52.
85 See John Joseph Wallis & Barry Weingast, Dysfunctional or Optimal Institutions?
State Debt Limitations, the Structure of State and Local Governments, and the Finance of
American Infrastructure, in Fiscal Challenges:  An Interdisciplinary Approach to Budget
Policy 329, 360-61 (Elizabeth Garrett, Elizabeth A. Graddy & Howell E. Jackson eds.,
2008).
86 Cal. Const. Art. 13A.
87 Mass. Gen. Laws Ch. 59 § 21C.
88 Nikolai Mikhailov & Jason Kolman, Lincoln Inst. of Land Pol’y, Types of Property
Tax and Assessment Limitations and Tax Relief Programs 3 (2001), https://www.lincolninst
.edu/subcenters/property-valuation-and-taxation-library/dl/mikhailov.pdf.
89 See id. at 252-53.
90 See Galle & Stark, note 6, at 605-06.
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taxes and also because of the loss of General Revenue Sharing in the
mid-1980’s.91  As states came to rely on more volatile sources of reve-
nue, they had to find a way to smooth out expenditures over the busi-
ness cycle in the absence of borrowing, and saving some current
revenue to spend on a “rainy day” was the accepted solution.
The procedures governing RDFs differ, with some requiring depos-
its of a particular percentage of revenue and fund levels of a particular
percentage of revenue or expenditures, while others are closer to dis-
cretionary.92  Rules on withdrawals can also vary in stringency.  Some
states require a supermajority vote to withdraw from the RDF, and
some require that withdrawals be repaid with interest, sometimes by
fiscal year end.93  In some cases, these rules may be strong enough to
inhibit use of the RDFs even when most needed.94  In general, RDFs
are relatively small and the consensus is that they have been inade-
quate to manage state fiscal crises.95  RDFs are discussed further in
Section V.A, in the context of a multistate RDF.
C. State Social Insurance and Redistributive Programs
The notion that social insurance and redistribution should be
largely handled by the most central level of government is already
challenged by the deep involvement of state and local governments in
redistribution.  To begin with, a number of the largest national social
insurance and redistribution programs have a joint federal/state struc-
ture.  For example, states are heavily involved in the Medicaid pro-
gram.  Technically, states fund Medicaid expenditures directly, but
then have a share of the expenditures reimbursed by the federal gov-
ernment.96  While federal law mandates minimum coverage for certain
populations,97 states are relatively free to expand Medicaid coverage
91 See Bruce A. Wallin, From Revenue Sharing to Deficit Sharing 137 (1998) (stating
that the loss of General Revenue Sharing led initially to lower state general fund balances).
92 See Gordon, note 78, at 252.
93 See id.
94 New York has not made a withdrawal from its Tax Stabilization Reserve Account
since 1992 and never from its Rainy Day Reserve Account.  See Citizen’s Budget Comm’n,
The Broken Umbrella:  How to Make New York State’s Rainy Day Fund More Useful 6
(2011), http://www.cbcny.org/sites/default/files/REPORT_BrokenUmbrella_06062011.pdf;
see also Office of State Comptroller, State of New York Comprehensive Annual Financial
Report 114-15 (Sept. 4, 2012), http://www.osc.state.ny.us/finance/finreports/2012cafr.pdf.
95 See Section V.A.
96 Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Financing & Reimbursement, http://www.medi-
caid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics/Financing-and-Reimbursement/
Financing-and-Reimbursement.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2014).  The expansion of Medi-
caid under the Affordable Care Act shifts more of the funding responsibility onto the
federal government, at least for those states that have adopted the expansion.
97 See 42 C.F.R. §§ 435.110-.170 (2012) (listing Medicaid mandatory eligibility groups).
For example, for parents with dependent children, the required minimum income standard
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beyond that.  For example, the range of eligibility for adults who are
parents of dependent children ranges from those whose incomes are
16% of the federal poverty line (Alabama) to 220% of the federal
poverty line (District of Columbia; the next highest state, Minnesota,
covers those with incomes up to 205% of the federal poverty line).98
The federal government reimburses between 50% and 75% of a
state’s (pre-Affordable Care Act) Medicaid costs, based on average
state income levels,99 so even at the most generous reimbursement
rate, a state still bears some direct costs of expanding Medicaid be-
yond the minimum coverage levels, costs that are borne by state
residents.
TANF, the latest iteration of the classic cash welfare program, is
funded largely through federal block grants to the states.100  There is
still a significant role for direct state spending, however, because in
order to receive the full TANF block grant, a state must directly con-
tribute some of its own money in order to satisfy the “maintenance of
effort” (MOE) requirement.101  To satisfy the MOE requirement, gen-
erally states have to spend around 80% of what they spent on welfare
and related programs in fiscal year 1994.102  MOE spending is signifi-
cant, accounting for almost half of total TANF spending.103  In addi-
tion, many localities provide substantial welfare aid, for example
through programs that help the homeless.104
is “a State’s [Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)] income standard in effect
as of May 1, 1998 for the applicable family size converted to a [modified adjusted gross
income]–equivalent standard.”  Id. at § 435.110(c)(1).
98 See Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., State Medicaid and CHIP Income Eligibil-
ity Standards 1 (2014), http://medicaid.gov/AffordableCareAct/Medicaid-Moving-Forward-
2014/Downloads/Medicaid-and-CHIP-Eligibility-Levels-Table.pdf.
99 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(b) (2012).  These are known as the Federal Medical Assistance
Percentages, or FMAPs.  Id.  While the maximum statutory FMAP is 83%, id., no state’s
FMAP exceeds 75%, see Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., note 96. This is not includ-
ing the increased FMAP of 90%-100% for the Medicaid expansion under the Affordable
Care Act.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(y)(1).
100 See generally Ctr. on Budget & Pol’y Priorities, Policy Basics, An Introduction to
TANF 1–3 (Dec. 4, 2012), http://www.cbpp.org/files/7-22-10tanf2.pdf.
101 See 42 U.S.C. § 609(a)(7) (2012); 64 Fed. Reg. 17,720, 17,816 (Apr. 12, 1999) (provid-
ing an explanation of the statute).
102 See 42 U.S.C. § 609(a)(7)(A), (B)(ii)-(iii).
103 See Liz Schott, LaDonna Pavetti & Ife Finch, Ctr. on Budget & Pol’y Priorities, How
States Have Spent Federal and State Funds Under the TANF Block Grant 5-6 (Aug. 7,
2012), http://www.cbpp.org/files/8-7-12tanf.pdf.
104 See Gillette, note 2, at 85.  These programs are largely confined to the large cities,
however.  See U.S. Census Bureau, Local Governments—Expenditures and Debt by State:
2008 tbl.456 (2012), available at http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/
12s0456.pdf (listing local government expenditures on public welfare by state); U.S. Census
Bureau, City Governments—Expenditures and Debt for Largest Cities:  2006 tbl.458
(2009) available at http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s0458.pdf (list-
ing welfare spending of the largest U.S. cities).  On average, municipalities spend relatively
little on redistributive programs.  See Leah Boustan, Fernando Ferreira, Hernan Winkley
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Perhaps more important than classic social insurance programs,
however, are K-12 public schools and, to a lesser degree, state higher
education.105  Public schools are funded out of a combination of local
property taxes and grants from the state and federal governments.106
The government grants are broadly redistributive—the revenues come
from progressive taxes and are spent in progressive ways, going dis-
proportionately to poorer school districts.107  And within a given lo-
cality, wealth is likely redistributed from those families with valuable
property to those with children,108 who for that reason have less dis-
posable income.
Higher education is a complicated subject, and higher education fi-
nancing is in a period of flux as of this writing.  Many states continue
to subsidize state colleges and universities, even as tuitions rise.109
The degree of actual redistribution, however, depends on issues like
the relative subsidization of flagship research universities versus com-
munity colleges and similar issues.  But at a first approximation, state
support for higher education likely acts to redistribute from the
wealthiest state residents to needy students and those supported eco-
nomically by colleges and universities.
Even state employment itself may be somewhat redistributive, with
tax revenue funding the wages and salaries of unionized teachers, la-
borers, and clerical workers.110  Indeed, the degree to which states and
localities act in a redistributive manner is hard to overstate, and the
& Eric M. Zolt, The Effect of Rising Income Inequality on Taxation and Public Expendi-
tures:  Evidence from U.S. Municipalities and School Districts, 1970–2000, 95 Rev. Econ.
& Stat. 1291, 1293 (2013) (finding less than 5% of local budgets spent on redistributive
programs).
105 See Boadway & Tremblay, note 1, at 1065 (noting that many quasi-private goods, like
education, health care, and social services are inherently redistributive).
106 See, e.g., Nat’l Ctr. for Education Stat., Revenues and Expenditures for Public Ele-
mentary and Secondary Education:  School Year 2010-11 (Fiscal Year 2011) 6, 8 (2013),
available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2013/2013342.pdf.
107 For example, Title I federal spending, under the Elementary and Secondary Educa-
tion Act, goes to school districts with disproportionate numbers of students from low-in-
come families.  20 U.S.C. §§ 6301-6587 (2013).
108 See Haydar Kurban, Ryan M. Gallagher & Joseph J. Persky, Estimating Local Redis-
tribution Through Property-Tax-Funded Public School Systems, 65 Nat’l Tax J., 629, 630
(2012).  The issue is complicated, however, to the degree that spending on public education
is capitalized into home values.  See Wallace E. Oates, The Effects of Property Taxes and
Local Public Spending on Property Values:  An Empirical Study of Tax Capitalization and
the Tiebout Hypothesis, 77 J. Pol. Econ. 957, 966 (1969).
109 See State Reports, Ill. St. U. College of Educ., http://education.illinoisstate.edu/
grapevine/statereports/ (last visited Oct. 4, 2014) (listing state appropriations for higher
education); Tuition and Fees at Flagship Universities over Time, Coll. Bd., http://
trends.collegeboard.org/college-pricing/figures-tables/tuition-and-fees-flagship-universi-
ties-over-time (last visited Oct. 4, 2014) (listing tuition and fees at state universities).
110 See Alberto Alesina & Reza Baqir, Redistributive Public Employment, 48 J. Urb.
Econ. 219, 219-21 (2002).
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forces driving states to do so have only increased in recent decades.111
Thus, beginning in the 1980’s the “new federalism” movement en-
couraged states to take on more of the roles that previously had been
ceded to the federal government in the 1960’s and 1970’s.112  As a
result, between 1952 and 2006 state budgets almost tripled as a share
of GDP and doubled as a share of overall government spending.113
While not all of that spending is redistributive, a substantial amount is,
particularly health care spending, such as the Medicaid spending dis-
cussed above.114  And there have been serious proposals to increase
the state role in these programs even further.115  State redistributive
policies are substantial and well-entrenched.
IV. ASSIGNMENT OF TAX FUNCTIONS
A central concern of fiscal federalism is the assignment of taxation
and good-provision functions between the multiple levels of govern-
ment in a federal system.  Of particular concern to this Article is the
proper assignment of the redistribution function, and therefore the
progressive income tax.  The standard view in the literature is that
redistribution, and therefore progressive income taxation,116 should
be exclusively allocated to the most central level of government—at
the federal level, in the United States—with subnational governments
focusing more on allocation of public goods and raising revenue from
flatter and more stable taxes, such as a real property tax.117  However,
in the more complicated world in which we live, it is not clear that this
strict division is optimal.  States are performing some redistributive
functions, and this may in fact be appropriate.
Yet, as discussed in Part II, a redistributive state tax-and-transfer
system performs not just a redistributive function, but an insurance
function as well.  And while the analysis that follows supports a partial
111 The Lewin Group, Rockefeller Inst. of Gov’t, Spending on Social Welfare Programs
in Rich and Poor States:  Key Findings 9-10 (2004), http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/social-welfare-
spending04/summary.pdf (prepared for the Office of the Ass’t Sec’y for Planning and Eval-
uation, U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs.).
112 See, e.g., John A. Ferejohn & Barry R. Weingast, Introduction, in The New Federal-
ism, note 56, at i, viii-x.
113 See Katherine Baiker, Jeffrey Clemens & Monica Singhal, The Rise of the States:
U.S. Fiscal Decentralization in the Postwar Period, 96 J. Pub. Econ. 1079, 1079 (2012).
114 See Hoynes & Luttmer, note 49, at 1466 (noting the rise of redistributive state health
care spending).
115 See, e.g., House Comm. on the Budget, The Path to Prosperity:  Restoring America’s
Promise:  Fiscal Year 2012 Budget Resolution 38-39 (2012) (outlining Rep. Paul Ryan’s
proposal to shift a larger share of the Medicaid burden to the states).
116 See McKinnon & Nechyba, note 56, at 49.
117 See Oates, Fiscal Federalism, note 1, at 143-44; McKinnon & Nechyba, note 56, at 19;
Darien Shanske, How Less Can Be More:  Using the Federal Income Tax to Stabilize State
and Local Finance, 31 Va. Tax. Rev. 413, 417-18 (2012).
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state redistributive role, the argument for state, as opposed to federal,
insurance against uncertain labor income is much weaker.  States are
simply not as well-positioned as insurers compared to the federal gov-
ernment, a fact clearly demonstrated by the strain on state budgets
during the Great Recession.
The next Section reviews the fiscal federalism arguments related to
the redistributive function of taxation.  Some recent theoretical and
empirical work implies that some state-level redistribution could be
desirable, or at least not as damaging as classic fiscal federalism theory
concludes.  This may explain, in part, the states’ increasing reliance on
progressive income taxes.118  The following Section turns to the insur-
ance function.  Even if states can engage in more redistribution with-
out the parade of horribles threatened by the classic fiscal federalism
literature, it still remains the case that state-level progressive income
taxation is costly from an insurance standpoint—it causes substantial
revenue volatility and is actuarially inefficient.  These are costs that
are likely better handled at the federal level.
A. Redistributive Function
The classic theoretical result of fiscal federalism is that redistribu-
tion and social insurance programs are best handled at the most cen-
tral level of government—in the United States, at the federal, rather
than the state or local, level.119  As developed in particular by Charles
Tiebout and Wallace Oates, the argument focuses on interstate com-
petition and migration:  States with significant redistributive policies
may become unattractive to higher-earning individuals and corre-
spondingly more attractive to lower-earning individuals.120  If taxpay-
ers are highly mobile within a nation, this could be costly to such a
state, since the state would prefer the reverse—to be attractive to
high-earning individuals, rather than low-earning individuals.
In addition, even those redistributive and social insurance programs
a state does offer may be suboptimal.  First, spillover effects at the
borders could cause some of the benefits to accrue to residents in
other states,121 which may lead state legislatures to discount the value
of such benefits.  Second, there are simply political constraints to the
provision of such benefits:  The net contributors are likely to be more
politically powerful than the net recipients.
118 See Cordes & Juffras, note 63, at 309-11; Gamage, note 6, at 759-60.
119 See note 1 and accompanying text.
120 Oates, Second Generation, note 1, at 351-52; Tiebout, note 1; see Stark note 1, at
1408-09.
121 See Oates, Fiscal Federalism, note 1, at 66; McKinnon & Nechyba, note 56, at 6;
Stark, note 1, at 1408-09.
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Thus, the tax law and public finance literature generally has con-
cluded that it is better for the central government, rather than subna-
tional governments, to provide social insurance and redistribution.
The cost of out-migration from the United States is much higher than
from any given state and spillover effects are minimal, and thus the
federal government would be better insulated against the possible
negative effects of redistributive policies.
This view tends to dominate policy and academic discussion, but a
close look at the theoretical and empirical literature reveals a more
nuanced set of conclusions about the role of state tax-and-transfer
programs.  It may be that some limited state role in redistribution—
perhaps close to what states are currently doing—is appropriate, and
may even be optimal.
1. Taxpayer Mobility
The argument that competition between states will drive out redis-
tributive policy depends on “Tiebout sorting,” the idea that residents
can choose where to live based on the policy mixes in different locali-
ties.  Thus a higher-earning individual might move to avoid high mar-
ginal rates, while a low-earning person might move to receive greater
income-support benefits.  In equilibrium, no redistribution would oc-
cur and any tax is just the price for benefits received from the
government.
Only in the setting where we have perfect competition and mobility
does the theory say that all taxes must be benefit taxes, however.  But
of course we do not have the perfect competition and costless mobility
that the Tiebout hypothesis requires.  When those assumptions are re-
laxed, the results are not as clear.122  Mobility in particular can actu-
ally be quite costly.123  If it is difficult for taxpayers to move, and if
there are factors that outweigh taxation (such as jobs, family, culture,
and the like), then states actually may have some room for redistribu-
tion with little repercussion.124
122 See, e.g., Bernard Dafflon, The Assignment of Functions to Decentralized Govern-
ment:  From Theory to Practice, in Handbook of Fiscal Federalism 271, 278-79 (Ehtisham
Ahmed & Giorgio Brosio eds., 2006).
123 See Pierre Salmon, Horizontal Competition Among Governments, in Handbook of
Fiscal Federalism, note 122, at 61, 68-69 (“[The high cost of moving] is often considered a
decisive objection to models—like the Tiebout model or the Oates and Schwab model—
that are dependent on the assumption of mobility.”).
124 That said, there is another dimension of state competition that is not dependent on
mobility.  What is sometimes called “yardstick competition” refers to the fact that residents
of one jurisdiction might compare their jurisdiction to another, favorably or unfavorably,
and reward or punish politicians accordingly.  See Ben Lockwood, The Political Economy
of Decentralization, in Handbook of Fiscal Federalism, note 122, at 33, 48-50; Susan Rose-
Ackerman, Risk-Taking and Reelection:  Does Federalism Promote Innovation?, 9 J. Legal
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Indeed, some theoretical models imply that the balance of redistrib-
utive policies between the federal and state governments is largely a
function of migration elasticity; where migration responsiveness to
taxation is high, redistributive policy ought to be handled by the fed-
eral government, but where migration responsiveness is low or nonex-
istent, it may be that states are actually better providers of
redistribution than the federal government.125  This could be the case
because state taxes can actually lower federal revenue, through labor
supply effects126 as well as the deduction for state and local taxes127
(though the latter effect may be partially offset by the Alternative
Minimum Tax128).  In the case where there is low mobility, rather than
absorbing that cost, the federal government may be better off just ced-
ing the redistributive function to the states entirely.  This may partly
explain the structure of the European Union federation, where redis-
tribution is still largely left to the individual member states.129
Furthermore, taxpayer mobility is also complicated by having three
(or more) levels of government, as typically occurs in the United
States:  local, state, and federal (plus county and special purposes
zones, like water and school districts).130  If a person likes the tax-and-
transfer system (and other benefits) of her locality, but not those of
her state, what to do?  Whether or not to move in such a case is not
theoretically clear.
But even where mobility is high, we should still expect to see states
engaging in some redistribution, for the same reason that govern-
Stud. 593, 593 (1980).  So even if voting with one’s feet is too costly, one can still vote.  If a
voter thinks that the grass is greener in a neighboring state, the politicians suffer.  But the
theoretical effect on state tax policy is unclear.  See Wallace E. Oates, On the Evolution of
Fiscal Federalism:  Theory and Institutions, 61 Nat’l Tax J. 313, 322-27 (2008) (summarizing
research on the impact of the yardstick competition on state tax policy); see also Koleman
S. Strumpf, Does Government Decentralization Increase Policy Innovation?, 4 J. Pub.
Econ. Theory 207, 227 (2002) (laying a foundation to use a game theory model for analyz-
ing the implications of the yardstick competition on local government policies).
125 See Roger H. Gordon & Julie Berry Cullen, Income Redistribution in a Federal Sys-
tem of Governments, 96 J. Pub. Econ. 1100, 1103, 1108 (2012).
126 See Robin Boadway, Maurice Marchand & Marianne Vigneault, The Consequences
of Overlapping Tax Bases for Redistribution and Public Spending in a Federation, 68 J.
Pub. Econ. 453, 454 (1998); Gordon & Cullen, note 125, at 1100; William R. Johnson, In-
come Redistribution in a Federal System, 78 Am. Econ. Rev. 570, 570 (1988).
127 See Stark, note 1, at 1417 (arguing that the deduction for state and local taxes en-
courages states to increase the progressivity of their income taxes, in part because some of
the costs of doing so will be borne by the federal government).
128 IRC §§ 55-59; see Galle & Klick, note 9, at 213-17.
129 See Gordon & Cullen, note 125, at 1100 n.3.
130 See Dafflon, note 122, at 283.  As of 2007 there were over 89,000 governmental units
in the United States. U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States:  2012,
State and Local Government Finances and Employment 267, available at http://www.cen-
sus.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s0428.pdf.
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ments engage in redistribution even if it depresses labor supply.131  If
there were no redistribution, then optimal tax theory would predict
that at the margin there would be welfare gains from redistributing
from high-income individuals to low-income individuals, assuming de-
clining marginal utility of income.132  That the transfer might result in
less income earned by high-income individuals in the state—whether
because of lower labor supply or migration—is offset by the welfare
gains to the low-income individuals.  It is only at the point where mi-
gration (or declines in labor supply) becomes high enough to offset
the welfare gains of redistribution that the standard optimal tax treat-
ment would tell a state not to increase redistribution further.133  Thus,
even in an idealized world with high mobility, we would still predict
some state-level redistribution.
2. Heterogeneity and Local Preferences
The classic theory is also complicated by the heterogeneity of states
and localities.  Jurisdictions are heterogeneous, both in terms of the
summation of individual preferences within the jurisdictions, and also
in terms of the benefits of living in the jurisdiction.  Indeed, the Tie-
bout hypothesis would predict as much—that there would be some
variation in social contracts in order to allow taxpayers to choose the
one that best lines up with his or her preferences.  Given this hetero-
geneity, we should expect the residents of some states to have a
greater desire for redistribution than the nation on average.  Thus,
even if the federal government chooses the degree of redistribution
favored by the national median voter, the median voter of, say, New
131 See, e.g., Peter Diamond & Emmanuel Saez, The Case for a Progressive Tax:  From
Basic Research to Policy Recommendations, 25 J. Econ. Persp., Fall 2011, at 165-70 (re-
viewing optimal tax literature and applying a similar model).
132 See Gordon & Cullen, note 125, at 1104.
133 To explain a bit more fully:  Suppose the federal government chooses some degree of
redistribution based on its maximization of the social welfare function.  Thus, it has per-
fectly balanced the utility gains from redistribution with the labor supply and utility losses
for high-income individuals.  If a state then decides to engage in additional redistribution,
that may cause additional labor supply effects but, as described above, the utility losses will
be borne in part by out-of-state residents, through the relative decline in federal tax reve-
nue.  The state loses less utility than the federal government would, at least in terms of
labor supply effects, and would accordingly pick some amount of redistribution greater
than the federal government would.  See id. at 1101. States, however, face the additional
cost, not faced by the federal government, of migration.  But if starting from a point of zero
redistribution, and thus zero tax migration, the utility benefits of redistribution would
likely initially outweigh the utility costs of migration.  See id. at 1104–06.  Even if a few
people migrate, the extra revenue can do good things—at least up until the point where
too many high-income individuals migrate.  See id. at 1108.
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York or California may desire yet more.134  Thus we should not be
surprised that some states add additional redistribution on top of the
federal government’s.
Moreover, in addition to different compositions of residents, the
states themselves provide different benefits, geographic ones in partic-
ular.  New York City and California can arguably charge higher situa-
tional rents, in the form of higher taxes, than can Arkansas.135
Similarly, states may be heterogeneous simply in the likelihood of mo-
bility in response to taxation.  If a given state’s residents are less likely
to move, for whatever reason, then the state has more freedom to
engage in redistribution.136
That said, heterogeneity may also be evidence of tax migration to
some degree.  Even if individuals are unlikely to move based on tax
policy alone, their tax policy preferences may correlate with other po-
litical, cultural, and economic preferences that in total do cause migra-
tion.137  But if that is the case, then what we actually observe is sorting
both in and out of states based in part on these policies.  For example,
those with libertarian-leaning preferences on taxation and other poli-
cies have likely already chosen New Hampshire over Massachusetts,
while those with preferences for more public goods and social insur-
ance have likely already chosen New York City over just about any-
where.  The unidirectional migration of high-ability individuals
predicted by the classic view is thus complicated by other factors.
Furthermore, even if states were homogenous, they might still pre-
fer local redistribution over national.138  Another key result of classic
fiscal federalism theory is that local public goods defined spatially (for
example, public mass transit or a local library) can be most efficiently
134 Looking to the median voter as the driver of policy is obviously a simplification of
complicated public choice and political economy questions, and I do not mean to specifi-
cally endorse it here.  See, e.g., Keith Krehbiel, Legislative Organization, J. Econ. Persp.,
Winter 2004, at 113, 114-17 (2004) (discussing criticisms of median voter theory and pro-
posing alternatives).  However, it can still be a useful heuristic in thinking about political
economy, see, e.g., Randall G. Holcombe, The Median Voter Model in Public Choice The-
ory, 61 Pub. Choice 115, 115-17 (1989) (comparing the median voter model to the perfect
competition model in economics, arguing that it is descriptive of a number of majority-rule
decisions), particularly on expenditure issues, see Boustan et al., note 104, at 1292.  Fur-
thermore, it is not crucial to the point that I adopt a particular theory of public choice; the
point is only that state and national policies may differ based on different compositions of
voters and political actors.
135 See Salmon, note 123, at 64.
136 See Gordon & Cullen, note 125, at 1105.
137 See Alden Speare, Frances Kobrin & Ward Kingkade, The Influence of Socioeco-
nomic Bonds and Satisfaction on Interstate Migration, 61 Soc. Forces 551, 551-52 (1982)
(discussing factors such as social bonds, duration of residence, and education as significant
factors in migration).
138 See McKinnon & Nechyba, note 56, at 48-50; Mark V.  Pauly, Income Redistribution
as a Local Public Good, 2 J. Pub. Econ. 35, 36 (1973).
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provided by the government whose political lines lie most close to the
spatial dimension for the local public good, all else equal.139  While
redistributive equity is, largely, a national (and arguably international)
issue, there are good reasons to think that people generally value re-
distribution more if it is to people close to them spatially, rather than
far away.  This comes from two main drivers:  first, that we tend to be
more altruistic towards those closest to us—family, friends, neigh-
bors—and second, that the relatively well-off have more of an interest
in mitigating the negative externalities of nearby poverty—crime,
blight, and the like.140  As shown by Mark Pauly, under certain as-
sumptions, this can lead to shared state-federal role in redistribu-
tion.141  In addition, Yair Listokin and David Schizer argue that tax
morale factors, such as the salience of local public goods, the greater
potential for individual involvement in local political decisionmaking,
and greater homogeneity of local communities give states and locali-
ties some additional ability to raise taxes compared to the federal
government.142
Finally, at least part of what is called redistribution actually pro-
vides direct benefits to the taxpayer.  As noted in Part II, progressive
income taxes and redistributive policies contain an insurance element
as well as a redistributive one, which means that even high-paying tax-
payers get some direct insurance value from a progressive income tax
that charges them a higher percentage of income.143  In addition, the
peacekeeping and economic stimulus elements of redistributive trans-
fers can create direct benefits to the high-paying taxpayer.144  This is
just to say, as discussed in Part II, that much of what is labeled “redis-
tribution” actually encompasses benefits to the taxpayer paying higher
taxes, and thus is less likely to drive her away.
3. Alternatives to Competition
State competition for high-value taxpayers is not the only possible
behavior.  Coordination and even collusion are also possible.145  This
may be more likely in federal systems with fewer subnational regions
139 See Oates, Fiscal Federalism, note 1, at 35.
140 See Pauly, note 138, at 37-38.
141 See id. at 58 (“[S]eparate governments could optimally perform at least some of the
redistributive function . . . when migration in response to tax or benefit differentials is not
quantitively overwhelming.”); see also McKinnon & Nechyba, note 56, at 48-51.
142 See Yair Listokin & David M. Schizer, I Like To Pay Taxes:  Taxpayer Support for
Government Spending and the Efficiency of the Tax System, 66 Tax L. Rev. 179, 201
(2013).
143 See Hoynes & Luttmer, note 49, at 1467.
144 See Bittker, note 37, at 48-54; Salmon, note 123, at 65.
145 See McKinnon & Nechyba, note 56, at 28-29.
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than the United States, such as Canada—it is difficult for the fifty
states to collude on, say, increasing the top rate of their income taxes.
But all fifty states need not coordinate—it may be enough just for
neighbors to do so.  Some neighboring states do appear to try to use
tax policy to poach residents, such as New Hampshire from Massachu-
setts.146  But states in other areas, such as the New York metropolitan
area, show at least some similarities in their tax policies.  While state
and local tax rates on top earners differ in New York, New Jersey, and
Connecticut, one cannot avoid income taxation entirely, as one could
in moving from Massachusetts to New Hampshire.
Furthermore, the trend generally among states seems to be to in-
crease the role of a progressive income tax in its tax mix.  While outli-
ers remain and some states have tried to lower rates,147 it is becoming
increasingly difficult to avoid state-level income taxes simply by mov-
ing.  This is in large part simply because of the large revenue needs of
a state, due to the substantial amounts of money that states spend on
public and quasi-public goods, even before redistributive concerns
enter the mix.148  With states already taxing the bases of property and
sales, income taxes have been the obvious next place to look.
4. Empirical Findings on Migration
Finally, the empirical research on the sensitivity of migration to
taxes is mixed.149  Studies by Charles Varner and Cristobal Young
have found relatively little migration by high-income individuals in
New Jersey150 and California151 in response to small surtaxes on high
146 See, e.g., John DiStaso, NH to “Taxachusetts”:  Bring It On, N.H. Union Leader, Jan.
20, 2013, http://www.unionleader.com/article/20130120/NEWS06/130129940.
147 See notes 73-74 (Hawaii and New Jersey).  Other states cutting rates include Illinois,
Indiana, Massachusetts, and North Carolina.  See Joseph Henchman, Taxes in Many States
Changing January 1, 2015, Tax Foundation Bog, http://taxfoundation.org/blog.taxes-many-
states-changing-january-1-2015.
148 See note 105 and accompanying text.
149 For a recent review of the literature claiming that state tax differences “have little to
no effect on whether and where people move,” see generally Michael Maserov, Ctr. on
Budget & Pol’y Priorities, State Taxes Have a Negligible Impact on Americans’ Interstate
Moves 1 (May 21, 2014), http://www.cbpp.org/files/5-8-14sfp.pdf.  For a critical view of this
report, see Lyman Stone, The Facts on Interstate Migration, Tax Found. (May 12, 2014),
http://taxfoundation.org/blog/facts-interstate-migration-part-one (last visited Nov. 19,
2014).
150 Cristobal Young & Charles Varner, Millionaire Migration and State Taxation of Top
Incomes:  Evidence from a Natural Experiment, 64 Nat’l Tax J. 255, 277–78 (2011).
151 Charles Varner & Cristobal Young, Millionaire Migration in California:  The Impact
of Top Tax Rates 3–4 (Stanford Ctr. on Poverty and Inequality, Working Paper, 2012),
available at http://www.stanford.edu/group/scspi/_media/working_papers/Varner-
Young_Millionaire_Migration_in_CA.pdf (prepared for the Calif. St. Bd. of Equalization).
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incomes.152  The New Jersey study found somewhat more, though still
relatively little, migration by retirees, who were thus less bound to a
location by employment,153 an effect also seen in studies of migration
due to estate tax differences.154  Those moving into a multistate met-
ropolitan area appear to be somewhat sensitive to tax rates in choos-
ing a place to live,155 though by definition these are individuals with
low mobility costs, since they have already made the choice to move.
Similarly, foreign soccer players in Europe appear to be highly sensi-
tive to tax rates, though professionals playing in their home countries
do not.156  And mobility is heterogeneous:  The young and highly-edu-
cated tend be more mobile and responsive to tax rates than more ex-
perienced and settled workers.157
152 New Jersey added a 8.97% top marginal rate on incomes over $500,000 beginning
with the 2004 tax year, a 2.6% increase from the previous top rate.  N.J. Stat. Ann.
§ 54A:2-1 (West).  For California, Varner and Young studied the effects of the introduction
of the Mental Health Services Tax in 2005, which levied a tax of 1% on incomes over $1
million.  Varner & Young, note 151, at 2.
153 See Young & Varner, note 150, at 272.
154 Jon Bakija & Joel Slemrod, Do the Rich Flee from High State Taxes?  Evidence from
Federal Estate Tax Returns 36 (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10645,
2004), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w10645.  Bakija and Slemrod find that
higher state estate and inheritance taxes are associated with a 1.4% to 2.7% drop in the
number of estate tax returns filed in a state.  Their result is statistically significant, but
obviously quite modest.
155 See Paul A. Coomes & William H. Hoyt, Income Taxes and the Destination of Mov-
ers to Multistate MSAs, 63 J. Urb. Econ. 920, 936-37 (2008).  Their results are somewhat
confusing, however, since they are statistically significant only when including states that
tax based on employment, not residence.  For states that tax based on residence, the results
are no longer statistically significant.  Thus, it is not clear that the study tells us much about
choice of residence based on taxes.  Id.
156 See Henrik Kleven, Camille Landais & Emmanuel Saez, Taxation and International
Migration of Superstars:  Evidence from the European Football Market, 103 Am. Econ.
Rev. 1892, 1922-24 (2013).  Anecdotally, some professional athletes in the United States
may also be responsive to tax differences.  See, e.g., Michael Lee, Trevor Ariza Agrees to
Deal With Rockets, Wash. Post, July 12, 2014, http://wapo.st/1kPQl73 (reporting that the
Washington Wizards player accepted an offer from the Houston Rockets for the same sal-
ary, in part because the cost of living and state taxes are lower in Texas than in the Wash-
ington, D.C. area).
157 See Jeffrey P. Thompson, Costly Migration and the Incidence of State and Local
Taxes 28 (Political Econ. Research Inst., Univ. Mass. Amherst, Working Paper No. 251,
2011), available at http://www.peri.umass.edu/fileadmin/pdf/working_papers/work-
ing_papers_251-300/WP251.pdf; see also Thomas Liebig, Patrick A. Puhani & Alfonso
Sousa-Poza, Taxation and Internal Migration:  Evidence from the Swiss Census Using
Community-Level Variation in Income Tax Rates, 47 J. Regional Sci. 807, 833-34 (2007)
(finding modest migration caused by tax increases, but that young and highly-educated
individuals were more responsive than older and less-educated individuals).  But see Mar-
tin Feldstein & Marian Vaillant Wrobel, Can State Taxes Redistribute Income?, 68 J. Pub.
Econ. 369, 391 (1998) (arguing that sensitivity to tax rates is high enough that wage rates
rise in response to out-migration, thus potentially canceling out any redistributive benefit
of higher taxes).
2014] FISCAL FEDERALISM AS RISK-SHARING 119
On the transfer side, one study found little interprovincial migration
in Canada as a result of different provincial policies, especially for un-
employment insurance.158  In the United States, a number of studies
have looked at the migration effects of policies like AFDC/TANF be-
cause of the relative differences in benefits between different states.159
The results vary from no tax migration effect at all160 to a relatively
large one.161
Of course, it is difficult for any empirical study to resolve this ques-
tion, since there are so many disparate factors that can affect migra-
tion.  Community, economic, employment, and family factors likely
overwhelm any tax effect, and thus the question is how taxation af-
fects migration, all else equal.  But all else is never equal, and any
study will suffer from omitted variable biases.  Furthermore, migra-
tion is surely sticky, and thus the effect of tax changes on migration
may play out only over a long period.162  Yet the empirical studies that
exist at least do not foreclose the idea that a state could get some net
benefit from employing redistributive policies.
5. Summary
In the end, the most we can probably say about the optimal level of
state-level redistribution is:  It is complicated.  But one thing does ap-
pear to be relatively clear:  Zero state-level redistribution is very
likely not the right answer.  Adjusting theoretical models with real
world constraints opens up space for states to engage in redistribution
158 See Kathleen M. Day & Stanley L. Winer, Policy-Induced Internal Migration:  An
Empirical Investigation of the Canadian Case, 13 Int’l Tax & Pub. Fin. 535, 535-36 (2006).
The unemployment insurance system in Canada is substantially more generous to residents
of states with above-average unemployment.  See id. at 535-36.  Day and Winer examine
over twenty years of tax data and ultimately find little migration based on these policy
differences, especially when compared to other factors, like political disruption in Quebec
in the 1970’s and the closing of the cod fishery on the east coast in 1992, affecting migration
from the Maritime Provinces.
159 For a brief description of why states differ, see Section III.C.
160 See, e.g., Robert Kaestner, Neeraj Kaushal & Gregg Van Ryzin, Migration Conse-
quences of Welfare Reform, 53 J. Urb. Econ. 357, 358-59 (2003); Phillip B. Levine & David
J. Zimmerman, An Empirical Analysis of the Welfare Magnet Debate Using the NLSY, 12
J. Population Econ. 391, 407 (1999).
161 See, e.g., Marı´a E. Enchautegui, Welfare Payments and Other Economic Determi-
nants of Female Migration, 15 J. Lab. Econ. 529, 549 (1997); Edward M. Gramlich &
Deborah S. Laren, Migration and Income Redistribution Responsibilities, 19 J. Hum. Re-
sources 489, 510 (1984); Paul E. Peterson & Mark Rom, American Federalism, Welfare
Policy, and Residential Choices, 83 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 711, 725-26 (1989).
162 The Young and Varner study on the New Jersey millionaire tax only included four
years after the tax change (with the 2007 year not including all late filers).  They argue that
this time period has been sufficient to show migration effects in other studies.  Young &
Varner, note 150, at 275-76.
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efficiently,163 and empirical work suggests that states could benefit on
balance from employing at least some redistribution.  And indeed,
there are substantial amounts of redistributive tax-and-transfer poli-
cies at the state level, even if dwarfed by the federal tax-and-transfer
system.164
B. Insurance Function
While a state may rationally choose to perform some redistribution
without causing crippling levels of migration, that does not mean that
there are no costs of state-level redistribution and progressive income
taxes.  This Section focuses on two other costs of a progressive income
tax:  fiscal volatility and the actuarial costs of a smaller risk pool.
These costs are rooted in the insurance function of a redistributive
tax-and-transfer system, rather than solely its redistributive function.
State fiscal volatility reflects the increased demand on the system as a
result of individual income fluctuations and shocks that are at least
somewhat independent of individuals’ endowments and effort, and
shows the strain on a state as it tries to smooth the volatility of indi-
viduals’ incomes.  And this is partly because a state risk pool is smaller
and more cross-correlated than a federal risk pool, and thus does not
provide sufficient income smoothing.165
1. Fiscal Volatility
Due to the fluctuation of incomes with the business cycle, personal
income taxes are among the most volatile of revenue sources, second
only to corporate income taxes.166  As a result, states that rely heavily
on personal income taxes face the risk of budget shortfalls during an
economic downturn, precisely when the demand for social services is
likely to be higher.167 Furthermore, state reliance on personal income
taxes has increased, going from 16.6% of total state and local tax reve-
nues in 1977 to a peak of 22.9% in 2008, before dropping to 20.5% in
163 Gordon and Cullen find that the degree of actual state-level redistribution is broadly
consistent with their optimal taxation model incorporating both positive and negative ex-
ternalities due to state taxation.  Gordon & Cullen, note 125, at 1108.
164 See Section III.C.
165 See Dafflon, note 122, at 278 (noting the “actuarial efficiency” of more centralized
redistributive programs).
166 See Cornia & Nelson, note 13, at 36 (stating that revenues generated by personal
income taxes are more volatile than all but corporate income and tobacco taxes); Deep &
Lawrence, note 21, at 8-11, 27 (describing and explaining income tax volatility); Gamage,
note 9, at 759-60 (stating that income tax revenues fluctuate more than sales tax revenues);
Sobel & Wagner, note 17, at 572 (comparing the elasticity of personal income taxes to sales
taxes and corporate income taxes).
167 See Galle & Stark, note 6, at 600; Gamage, note 6, at 759-60; Super, note 6, at 2632.
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2010168 (the drop in response to the Great Recession being evidence
of precisely that short-term volatility).
A progressive income tax is especially volatile, since it raises a
greater proportion of its revenue from the wealthiest residents.  In-
come for those in higher brackets tends to be more volatile, especially
because capital income is a larger proportion of overall income for
high earners,169 and thus a progressive income tax is likely to be more
volatile than a proportional income tax that has the same expected
revenue.170  Finally, as income inequality increases, the relative reli-
ance on volatile upper incomes is becoming even more pronounced.171
The procyclical volatility on the revenue side is also exacerbated by
the procyclical nature of much state spending.  States carry a large
share of the burden of redistributive social insurance programs, such
as Medicaid, TANF, and unemployment insurance.172  Ironically,
given the classic fiscal federalism view that redistribution and social
insurance should be centralized, the design of much of these programs
derives from some of the same theories of fiscal federalism.  Oates
and Musgrave, among others, argue that a major problem with state-
level programs such as these is the potential for spillovers to nonresi-
dents, which could lead to underprovision of goods and services, since
the costs to the state could outweigh the benefits to its residents.173
The way to address this, they argue, is with federal matching grants as
a Pigouvian subsidy.174  The matching grant lowers the price to the
state government down to a level where they are willing to provide
the good or service.  The catch, however, is that states have to step up
and allocate some of their budgets to the program, in amounts that
may be somewhat out of reach during economic downturns.175
To be clear, however, the state budget problems are not only be-
cause of the volatility of the progressive income tax and the provision
of social services.  Indeed, the federal government relies largely on a
168 Urban-Brookings Tax Pol’y Ctr., Total Government Revenues, 1977-2011 (Sept. 20,
2013), http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxfacts/Content/PDF/dqs_table_51.pdf.
169 See Galle & Stark, note 6, at 606 (“Unlike low and middle-income households,
wealthy households derive a substantial share of their income from notoriously volatile
sources, such as capital gains, dividends, restricted stock, and stock options.”).
170 See Sobel & Wagner, note 13, at 574 (“Using an average of all state income tax codes
interacted with the data above suggests an average variability of 1.14 that could potentially
be reduced to 0.87 simply by adopting a completely proportional income tax.”).
171 See Galle & Stark, note 6, at 606.
172 See id. at 606-07.
173 See Richard A. Musgrave & Peggy Musgrave, Public Finance in Theory and Practice
509 (4th ed. 1984); Oates, Fiscal Federalism, note 1, at 65-75; Gordon & Cullen, note 127,
at 1108.
174 See Musgrave & Musgrave, note 173, at 509; Oates, Fiscal Federalism, note 1, at 65-
75.
175 See Super, note 6, at 2587.
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personal income tax, and a much more progressive one, without
nearly as much budget strain, and obviously spends a lot on redistribu-
tive social insurance programs.  As discussed below, this is in part be-
cause the federal government is better able to handle the risk of
revenue volatility, but state expenditure volatility also stems from the
additional features of state tax and budget policy discussed in Part III.
As a result of balanced budget requirements, debt limits, and other
fiscal institutions,176 states cannot easily borrow to make up revenue
shortfalls during an economic downturn.  This means that a state may
not be able even to maintain its baseline level of expenditures and
services, much less deal with the increased demand for safety net ser-
vices during a downturn.177  The federal government, by contrast, can
borrow cheaply and easily, and is thus much more able to maintain or
even increase spending during a recession.
Since a state cannot implement counter-cyclical budget policy well
using debt, the standard answer has been for it to instead maintain a
rainy-day fund—set aside a portion of revenue during strong eco-
nomic times in order to make up revenue shortfalls during weaker
times.178  Yet as an empirical matter, state RDFs are generally un-
derfunded and do not sufficiently cover costs during downturns.179
This is especially so during extreme times such as the period beginning
with the 2008 financial crisis.  Even a fully funded RDF would be un-
likely to cover extreme events such as that.180
As a result of limited borrowing capacity and limited use of RDFs,
states that rely more heavily on volatile personal income taxes face
more revenue, and thus expenditure, volatility.  This exacerbates the
economic effects of the business cycle, rather than mitigating them the
way Keynesian theory teaches.  The resulting economic slowdown, job
losses, and the like, are very real costs to states.  This is not the way
insurance ought to operate.
176 See Subsection III.B.1.
177 This is not say that states do not borrow money.  Indeed, current state and local debt
is near $3 trillion.  Jeffrey L. Barnett & Phillip M. Vidal, U.S. Census Bureau, State and
Local Government Finances Summary:  2011, at 2 (2013), available at http://www2.census
.gov/govs/local/summary_report.pdf.  However, fiscal institutions limit such borrowing
largely to capital projects.  While accounting gimmicks are available to apply some of that
debt toward state operating budgets, states are nonetheless constrained in practice from
using debt to expand welfare spending.  See, e.g., Super, note 6, at 2607; see also Section
III.1.
178 See Section III.B.3.
179 See Deep & Lawrence, note 16, at 16; Galle & Stark, note 6, at 611-17; Gamage, note
6, at 766.
180 RDFs are discussed more fully in Section V.A.
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2. Risk-Pooling and Actuarial Efficiency
A related problem to the fiscal volatility issue is the issue of effi-
cient risk-pooling.  If a tax-and-transfer system is, in part, a group of
individuals who ex ante pool their risk of having uncertain income,
then the question is, what is the optimal risk pool for doing so?  Sim-
ply put, the bigger and more diverse, the better.
Consider a small community of people with a large degree of corre-
lation in employment risk—a factory town, say.  An income tax as a
means of pooling income and employment risk will not be all that
successful at the times when it is most needed.  If one person loses his
job, revenue from the rest of the community can still sufficiently fund
the government, including any social services the unemployed worker
might rely on, such as unemployment insurance.  But if the factory
closes, it is unlikely that the community could provide the same bene-
fits to everyone.  To do so, it would either need to have saved an ex-
cessively large amount of money during good times, or it would have
to borrow money at likely prohibitive interest rates (given the lack of
future revenue to service the debt).
On the other hand, if the community got together with other com-
munities with different sources of income, uncorrelated with the first
community’s factory, it becomes much easier to share the risks of bad
fortune—it is more likely that there will always be sufficient revenue
to maintain whatever safety net and other services the communities
wish to provide.
In standard insurance theory, the variance in the amount of possible
payouts decreases with a larger risk pool, even if the expected payout
amount stays the same.181  The insurer can lower substantially the
likelihood of an extreme payout, such as when the factory closes, by
increasing the size of the risk pool.  There might be a good chance in
any given period that a factory closes, but the chance that all the fac-
tories in all the towns close in a given period is much lower.
Applied to the states, if income shocks are regional,182 then a given
state is not a particularly well-suited risk pool.183  The citizens of Loui-
siana would have trouble insuring each other from the income risks of
another Hurricane Katrina, as would the citizens of Michigan against
a collapse in the auto industry.184 This is especially so given the issues
discussed in the prior Subsection—states are not able to deficit spend
181 See, e.g., Judy Feldman Anderson & Robert Brown, Risk and Insurance 2-5 (2005),
available at http://www.soa.org/files/pdf/P-21-05.pdf.
182 Some shocks are national or even international, of course.  I address highly corre-
lated income shocks in Subsection V.A.3.
183 See Deep & Lawrence, note 16, at 8-11 (describing regional income shocks).
184 See Anderson & Brown, note 181, at 5.
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at optimal levels.  Assigning progressive income taxation largely to the
federal government would thus provide an insurance benefit at a
lower cost, due to the greater number of people insured, the lower
volatility of income, and the ability to borrow cheaply.  Handling the
insurance function of progressive income taxation instead at the state
level thus carries costs relative to the federal level.
This feeds back into the fiscal volatility problem noted above.  A
state with a redistributive tax-and-transfer system is at least implicitly
making a commitment to provide some insurance against uncertain
future drops in labor income.  It is thus absorbing some of the risk of
uncertain income that otherwise would be held by individuals.  The
volatility seen in state budgets as a result of the business cycle is there-
fore in part a reflection of that risk-absorption; if incomes did not fluc-
tuate, neither would state revenues or transfers.185  But what we
observed during the Great Recession is that states are not able to
meet their insurance commitments, and this is in part a reflection of
the fact that they are simply not that able to handle the risks that they
are insuring against.
C. Summary
This Part argues that a state may be able to provide some redistri-
bution at a reasonable cost, but that it is less able to provide income
insurance at a reasonable cost.  The obvious answer from a fiscal fed-
eralism standpoint, then, would be to allocate some of the redistribu-
tive function to the states, but to let the federal government largely or
exclusively handle the insurance function.  The difficulty is that both
of those functions are rooted in the same tax functions:  the insurance
function is baked into the redistributive programs, and the progressive
income tax in particular.  Therefore, while the articulation of the dif-
ferent costs and benefits of redistribution and income insurance helps
to focus the issues, it does not provide a clear way to balance them.
The next Part attempts to do so.
V. STATE REDISTRIBUTION WITH FEDERAL REINSURANCE
Suppose a state without a progressive income tax was considering
adding one in order to increase redistribution and reduce income ine-
quality.  Section IV.A suggests that it probably should go ahead; if
that were a policy favored by the state residents, then the welfare
gains from that additional redistribution would likely offset any nega-
tive effects to labor supply due to migration or shifts to leisure.  But
185 See note 8.
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by performing redistribution, the state would also be providing insur-
ance against uncertain income, and Section IV.B argues that many
states are not well equipped to do so.  Absorbing the risk of uncertain
income is expensive and volatile for a state.
But the fact that these costs of a progressive income tax are rooted
in insurance, rather than tax competition, points a way to a potential
solution:  reinsurance.  That is, the typical approach for an insurer
who cannot adequately manage all the risks it has insured against is to
re-allocate some of that risk to a different party.186  If a state that has
implicitly insured against excessive income volatility of its residents
can offload some of that risk to a party that operates on a national
scale, such as the federal government, then we could have a system
with some state-level redistribution, but national-level income
insurance.
Framed as a problem of insurance and reinsurance, the obvious so-
lution is a pooled insurance vehicle for states, otherwise known as a
multistate RDF.  Relatively little has been written about multistate
RDFs,187 and even less that is positive.188  Nonetheless, the framework
of this Article suggests that a multistate RDF could have substantial
benefits for state and federal fiscal policy.  Whether it can overcome
political and logistical obstacles is less clear, however.  Thus, I also
consider below what mix of existing policies could be expanded and
coordinated to replicate the reinsurance effects of a multistate RDF.
Viewed in this way, a number of policies that normally are considered
independently in fact ought to be considered as a comprehensive risk
management scheme for fiscal federalism.  The multistate RDF
thought experiment thus points the way toward a more holistic view of
fiscal federalism.
A. Multistate Rainy Day Fund
One standard answer to the problem of state fiscal volatility due to
state balanced budget constraints is for a state to maintain a RDF.
Having an RDF decreases state expenditure volatility somewhat,189
thus helping a state to weather business cycle downturns.  Yet for
186 See, e.g., David M. Raim & Joy L. Langford, Understanding Reinsurance, in 4 New
Appleman Insurance Law Practice Guide § 40.01, at 40-5 to 40-6 (Jeffrey E. Thomas, Leo
Martinez & Marc S. Mayerson eds., 2013).
187 See Galle & Stark, note 6, at 617 (noting lack of literature).  For examples of propos-
als, see Deep & Lawrence, note 21, at 18-30, and Mattoon, note 21, passim.
188 See Galle & Stark, note 6, at 618-19; Gamage, note 6, at 766-68 (arguing that state
revenue insurance is not feasible).
189 See Brian Knight & Arik Levinson, Rainy Day Funds and State Government Sav-
ings, 52 Nat’l Tax J. 459, 469-70 (1999); Oates, note 124, at 328-29; Sobel & Wagner, note
13, at 574-75.
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nearly every state, independent RDF size is suboptimal, and RDFs
have not saved states from much of the pain of revenue volatility.190
In principle, using an RDF is not all that different from deficit
spending—both are a form of dissaving.  A state with an RDF would
increase its savings during good times, by depositing funds in the
RDF.191  A state that borrowed to cover revenue shortfalls would pay
off debt acquired during bad times, thus also increasing its net savings
(from a negative amount toward $0).  During bad times, a state with
an RDF would withdraw funds from the RDF, thus lowering its sav-
ings,192 just as a deficit-spending state would by borrowing.193
Example: States A and B each have an annual budget of
$1000. State A maintains an RDF equal to 15% of expendi-
tures, so $150, invested in Treasury bonds. State B has no
RDF, but does not have a balanced budget requirement.  In
Year 0, State A thus has savings of $150 (it is a creditor for
$150), and State B’s net debt is $0.  In Year 1, each state has a
revenue shortfall of $150. State A sells the bonds held by its
RDF to make up the shortfall, while State B borrows $150
from the debt market.  Each state’s net savings has decreased
by $150.  (State A: $150 → $0; State B: $0 → -$150.)  In Year
2, tax revenues generate $1150 in each state. State A puts the
surplus revenue back into its RDF, by buying Treasury
bonds. State B uses the $150 surplus to pay back its loans
from Year 1.  Thus each state’s net savings has increased by
$150.  (State A: $0 → $150; State B: -$150 → $0.)
In the example, the main difference is whether a state self-insures
or is able to rely on the credit markets to fund revenue shortfalls.  But
in this simplified example, the full debt is paid off in the next period.
More realistically, the states would take time to either fund the RDF
or service the debt.  As a result, the annual payments, in the idealized
case, would be an actuarially fair premium194 to the RDF for State A,
and the interest or amortization on the debt for State B.
190 See Deep & Lawrence, note 16, at 16; Galle & Stark, note 6, at 601-02, 611; Gamage,
note 6, at 766-67.
191 If it invested the RDF in Treasury bonds or similar assets, it would actually be de-
creasing its net debt position (by becoming a net creditor), much as a state that borrowed
money would decrease its net debt position by paying down debt in good times.
192 Or, if the RDF held bonds, increasing its net debt position.
193 An alternative analogy is dissaving through sales of property.  States will sometimes
sell assets, such as real property, during a downturn.  An RDF is just another asset, and
selling it is analogous to selling a building.  Indeed, states will often structure such a sale as
a sale-leaseback, which is similar to an RDF withdrawal plus regular contributions, or bor-
rowing and paying interest.  See Super, note 6, at 2613 n.266, 2624.
194 That is, the annual expected cost of the risk being insured.
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Here, a comparison to the life-cycle hypothesis for consumer spend-
ing is apt.195  Basic models of consumer life-cycle spending assume
that consumers are able to borrow to cover income shocks but that
where there are borrowing constraints they would instead self-insure
through savings.196  Insurance and borrowing are in effect substitutes
for one another, and the need for self-insurance is greater when bor-
rowing is constrained.197  And indeed, that is precisely the case for
states with balanced budget requirements and debt limits:  They are
essentially forced to self-insure through RDFs because they are not
able to borrow sufficiently to fund revenue shortfalls.
But borrowing, if available, may be preferred (assuming away polit-
ical costs) to self-insurance.198  This is in part because interest on debt
is likely to be cheaper than saving the equivalent of an actuarially fair
premium (or more) to self-insure.  Interest rates, at least to some de-
gree, will reflect macroeconomic conditions like the overall risk in the
market, and not only the individual credit risk of the debtor.  Debt is
more similar to pooled insurance than self-insurance, and shares some
of the same efficiencies.  Just as with the insurance properties of a
progressive income tax, discussed above, the risk-pooling aspect of
pooled insurance can allow for efficiencies and economies of scale
when risks are not fully correlated across the risk pool.199  A risk-
averse self-insurer would likely have to save more than the equivalent
pooled insurance premiums or the debt service payments if it bor-
rowed to cover income shocks.200
195 See, e.g., Franco Modigliani, The Life Cycle Hypothesis of Saving, the Demand for
Wealth and the Supply of Capital, 33 Soc. Res. 160, 162-63 (1966); Franco Modigliani &
Richard Brumberg, Utility Analysis and the Consumption Function:  An Interpretation of
Cross-Section Data, in Post-Keynesian Economics 388 passim (Kenneth K. Kurihara ed.,
1954) (establishing the life-cycle hypothesis).
196 See, e.g., Angus Deaton, Saving and Liquidity Constraints, 59 Econometrica 1221,
1222 (1991) (“Precautionary motives interact with liquidity constraints because the inabil-
ity to borrow when times are bad provides an additional motive for accumulating assets
when times are good, even for impatient consumers.”); Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas &
Jonathan A. Parker, Consumption over the Life Cycle, 70 Econometrica 47, 49 (2002)
(“Our fitted model indicates that wealth is accumulated early in life for precautionary rea-
sons—were it not for income uncertainty, households would instead borrow against future
labor income.”); Modigliani & Brumberg, note 195, at 4-6.
197 The degree of self-insurance is also related to the ability to purchase insurance.  See,
e.g., Franco Modigliani, The Role of Intergenerational Transfers and Life Cycle Saving in
the Accumulation of Wealth, J. Econ. Persp., Spring 1988, at 15, 17 (noting that the amount
of self-insurance depends in part on factors like the existence of retirement and health
insurance).
198 See Robin Boadway, Intergovernmental Redistributive Transfers:  Efficiency and
Equity, in Handbook of Fiscal Federalism, note 122, at 355, 370 (equating borrowing with
self-insurance).
199 See Deep & Lawrence, note 16, at 16.
200 As a practical matter, some organizations and institutions may choose to self-insure,
such as by creating their own employee health insurance plan.  In this case, the organiza-
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Thus, state fiscal institutions and practices, especially debt and bor-
rowing limits,201 force states away from debt-financing income
shocks—which would have some risk-pooling efficiencies—to self-in-
suring through RDFs, a more expensive and risky approach, and one
far less able to handle extreme events.202
With each state effectively on its own, it should come as little sur-
prise that state RDFs have not been adequate to fund large revenue
shortfalls.203  Self-insurance against uncorrelated risk is simply not the
best move.  Consider the inefficiencies of requiring every individual to
self-insure against untimely death or property loss.  This would lead to
either massive over-saving or frequent painful consumption shocks.
The counter-factual is absurd, simply because the market case for in-
surance in these situations is so clear that the product has existed for
centuries.  Why not a similar approach for states?
In its simplest form, a multistate RDF would function essentially
like pooled insurance.  Each state would pay an annual premium to
the multistate RDF—much as they already are to their own indepen-
dent RDFs—and the multistate RDF would pay out when revenue
dropped below a particular level.204  The premiums would be based on
a combination of overall group risk, with perhaps some experience-
rated variation to account for differences among states.  The premi-
ums would also depend on the size of the particular state’s budget.
The payout itself would be some percentage of the shortfall from ex-
pected revenues.  For example, if a state is expected to raise (or, alter-
natively, had spending commitments of) $1000 per capita but only
raised $700 per capita, the RDF could make up the shortfall.  Depend-
ing on the degree of co-insurance, the RDF might pay out 100% of
the $300 shortfall, or something less than 100%.
tion is generally large enough to be a sufficiently diverse risk pool.  By self-insuring it can
avoid the fees and overhead expenses of third-party insurance, and can also tailor its plans
more closely to its employees’ situations.  This argument does not apply as clearly to states,
since we are not comparing third-party private insurance to self-insurance.
201 See Subsection III.B.1.  As noted there, the rules themselves may not be as restric-
tive as the restraints from voters, customs, and bond markets, but the whole picture is
nonetheless one where states are limited in their ability to borrow.  See Gamage, note 6, at
750 n.4.
202 This is not to say the credit markets do not currently play a role.  States are not
completely constrained from borrowing.  See note 177.  Furthermore, individuals them-
selves still have access to debt.  As a result, the credit markets likely do already do play
some role in income smoothing.  See Pierfederico Asdrubali, Bent E. Sorensen & Oved
Yosha, Channels of Interstate Risk Sharing:  United States 1963-1990, 111 Q.J. Econ. 1081,
1092 (1996) (finding that 23% of shocks to gross state product are smoothed by credit
markets).
203 See note 179 and accompanying text.
204 This is not to suggest that this is a simple matter.  I explore some of the problems in
measuring downturns in Subsection V.A.2.
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Premiums and payouts would thus depend on the relative size of the
state’s budget.  A state like California would contribute much more,
but also get larger payouts, than a state like Rhode Island.  This raises
the question, however, of when a state becomes large enough to be a
sufficiently diverse risk pool on its own.  California may be such a
state, though further research and modeling would be required to be
certain.  California is limited in its ability to borrow, however, which
means that it is still not as well-equipped to self-insure as it could be.
While the financial case for such a multistate RDF is strong, the
practicalities of real-world administration are a different matter.  In
my view, for a multistate RDF to be feasible and desirable, it would
have to be designed to limit adverse selection and moral hazard
problems, it would have to have a mechanism for dealing with cross-
correlation and “tail risk,” and it would have to be politically and lo-
gistically feasible.  I discuss each of these elements, and some of the
additional design features that would go along with them, in turn
below.
1. Adverse Selection
Because the multistate RDF would operate much like insurance,
the key potential problems are the classic ones for any insurance pro-
gram:  adverse selection and moral hazard.
The adverse selection problem is the potential for an insurance pro-
gram to be more attractive to the riskiest parties, and that the least
risky parties may find participation too expensive to participate, given
their risks.  This can result in the pool of insureds being especially
risky, which would increase claims and drive up costs.  In this worst
case, this can create a downward spiral leading to breakdown in the
market altogether.205
In the revenue-insurance context, the adverse selection problem is
that the multistate RDF may only be attractive to the most volatile
states.  If a state paid an actuarially fair premium—an “experience-
rated” amount based on the expected value of payouts to that
state206—there would likely not be substantial savings over self-insur-
ing through an independent RDF, and it would be particularly expen-
sive for the high-volatility states.  But a premium based on average
risk to the whole group would be a bad bet for a low volatility state—
it could end up paying more in premiums than any expected payouts it
would receive.  For individuals, risk aversion often still makes such a
205 E.g., David M. Cutler & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Adverse Selection in Health Insur-
ance, in 1 Frontiers in Health Policy Research 1, 8 (Alan M Garber ed., 1998) (referring to
the “adverse selection death spiral”).
206 See note 46.
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transaction worthwhile,207 but it is not clear that politicians behave in
the same way.  Research suggests that politicians are myopic, and
therefore would likely prefer to spend money on a show project today,
rather than on an insurance policy against revenue shortfalls to-
morrow (when they may be out of office anyway).208  Indeed, we al-
ready know that states are not putting aside sufficient amounts in their
own RDFs,209 and it is likely that incentives to politicians would not
be any different in the multistate case.
Generally the adverse selection problem in insurance is addressed
through mandates of one kind or another.  The Affordable Care Act
imposes a fine/tax on individuals who do not purchase health insur-
ance,210 and mortgage lenders generally require homeowners to take
out homeowner insurance policies.211  Deep and Lawrence suggest
that their proposal for multistate tax base insurance be mandated, par-
ticularly if the federal government would be on the hook for losses
outside the capacity of the insurance program.212
Galle and Stark, by contrast, propose federal subsidies rather than
mandates to induce states to better fund and manage their indepen-
dent RDFs.  They address a different problem—encouraging states to
sufficiently self-insure, rather than encouraging low-volatility states to
participate in a multistate RDF.  But they recognize that mandates in
this context would be a difficult sell, particularly if the multistate RDF
is only quasi-governmental.213  If the RDF were in fact a federal pro-
gram, then in principle the federal government could use a pay-to-play
mandate, requiring states to pay up if they wanted to receive any fu-
ture bail-outs.  In practice, however, the ability of the federal govern-
ment to credibly commit to deny bail-outs to nonparticipants is
doubtful.214
Thus, the federal government would likely have to subsidize the
RDF premiums such that even low-volatility states would have a posi-
tive expected return from participating in the program.  While this
may still run up against the short-term bias of politicians, as Galle and
207 E.g., Matthew Rabin & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies:  Risk Aversion, J. Econ.
Persp., Winter 2001, at 219.
208 See Alessandra Bonfiglioli & Gino Gancia, Uncertainty, Electoral Incentives and
Political Myopia, 123 Econ. J. 373, 376-87 (2013); Galle & Stark, note 6, at 608-09; Rose-
Ackerman, note 124, at 595-96 (each summarizing research).
209 See Deep & Lawrence, note 16, at 16; Galle & Stark, note 6, at 611-17; Gamage, note
6, at 766.
210 IRC § 5000A.
211 See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs, A Consumer’s Guide to Home Insurance 1
(2010), available at http://www.naic.org/documents/consumer_guide_home.pdf.
212 See Deep & Lawrence, note 16, at 27.
213 Galle & Stark, note 6, at 620-22.
214 But see Galle & Stark, note 6, at 616 n.95 (suggesting that the U.S. federal govern-
ment does have the ability to credibly threaten not to bail out states).
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Stark note,215 it has a better chance of inducing participation than a
system that uses a more actuarially fair premium.
2. Moral Hazard
Moral hazard presents a different and, in the context of this Article,
more interesting problem.  Moral hazard is essentially the problem
that some insured may end up behaving riskier than they would other-
wise, because the costs of that risk are spread around and covered by
insurance.  In the context of state finances this could manifest, for ex-
ample, as a state getting lazy about collections, or making changes to
the tax law that lower revenue below the insurance payout threshold,
or making giveaways to privileged interest groups.  As Akash Deep
and Robert Lawrence note, however, much of this can be managed by
carving out policy changes and looking only at policy-neutral
changes.216 The baseline could adjust based on policy changes, such as
a tax cut or new tax expenditure, and then any shortfall would be de-
termined based on the new baseline.217  Furthermore, revenue could
be measured based on what ought to be collected, rather than what
actually is collected.
The more likely problem is simply that states will increase their reli-
ance on volatile revenue sources, such as increasing the progressivity
of their personal income tax.218  Here, however, we have to differenti-
ate “good” from “bad” moral hazard.219  In the context of social insur-
ance, some moral hazard is “good,” in the sense that the behavior is
socially positive.  For example, in the health care context, there is the
potential for insured persons to seek more health care than they
would if uninsured, which would end up raising overall costs—a moral
215 See Galle & Stark, note 6, at 624-26 (suggesting subsidy features designed to en-
courage politicians to make better use of RDFs).
216 Deep & Lawrence, note 16, at 21; see also Boadway, note 198, at 370-72 (discussing
the need to distinguish income shocks from mere fiscal changes).  But see Ben Lockwood,
Inter-Regional Insurance, 72 J. Pub. Econ. 1, 4-5 (1999) (discussing how even an optimal
interregional insurance program can lead to distortions in the supply of public goods).
217 Which is not to say that picking a baseline is easy of course.  Any determination of
what constitutes a policy “change” would undoubtedly by fraught and contested, and the
success of a multistate RDF would depend heavily on the design of such rules.  Because
this Article pursues the theoretical and economic case for the multistate RDF, in part as a
way to better explain the risk-sharing aspects of a federal system, such detailed design
questions are beyond its scope.  Yet they would be central to any actual implementation,
and I hope that further work will explore them.
218 Another potential moral hazard problem is the anticipation of future federal bail-
outs.  See, e.g., Galle & Stark, note 6, at 616 (discussing the moral hazard of bail-outs);
Oates, note 124, at 319 (discussing soft budget constraints and raiding the fiscal commons).
219 See Baker, note 34, at 288-89 (discussing positive externalities from insurance); Ny-
man, note 19, at 370-71.
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hazard problem.  But the result is also more care, which is, on balance,
a good thing and welfare-enhancing.220
In the context of taxation, the good moral hazard is the use or ex-
pansion of redistribution.  Because having some state income taxation
would likely lead to a greater degree of overall redistribution, those in
favor of greater redistribution should see such moral hazard as an
overall good, even if it costs the insurer some.221  And just as the ulti-
mate goal of health insurance is to provide health care, so is one of the
goals of a progressive income tax to provide redistribution.  There-
fore, moral hazard concerns alone should not be a reason to reject the
multistate RDF approach.
But on the other hand, there are forms of bad moral hazard that
would need to be policed against.  In addition to cutting back on col-
lection efforts, a state might also engage in accounting gimmickry to
generate larger paper losses.  The European Union has seen both
kinds of bad behavior, underscoring the difficulty of policing these
types of behaviors.222  Some of this would have to be policed through
regulation and monitoring.  Some of it, however, would also be po-
liced by voters and markets.  After all, tax migration still looms as a
potential check on the ability of states to raise marginal rates too high,
and voters might intervene before it gets to that point.  And at the
time of this writing, politicians in some states have essentially turned
down free money to expand state Medicaid programs because doing
so would go against their normative preferences.223
Finally, we should be cautious about fully accepting moral hazard
objections to social insurance.224  Moral hazard has been raised as an
objection to just about every government program for risk manage-
ment and social insurance, such as limited corporate liability,225 bank-
ruptcy,226 deposit insurance,227 unemployment insurance,228 and so on.
220 See note 219.  This is not to say that all additional care is good, of course.  Some will
be excessive and wasteful.  But the point is that, for at least some currently uninsured
individuals, receiving some additional care above what they currently receive is good, even
if costly.
221 Assuming that the multistate RDF was either part of or backstopped by the federal
government, the added cost would mean perhaps some greater burden on the federal in-
come tax, which in turn would likely be borne most heavily by high-income taxpayers.  See
Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate Structure:  A New Look
at Progressive Taxation, 75 Cal. L. Rev. 1905, 1906-07, 1945 (1987).  Thus, national redistri-
bution would still be served.
222 See Oates, Second Generation, note 1, at 365-66.
223 See, e.g., Sabrina Tavernise & Robert Gebeloff, Millions of Poor Are Left Uncov-
ered by Health Law, N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 2013, at A1.
224 On problematic moral hazard arguments, see generally Baker, note 34, passim.
225 See Moss, note 26, at 67-68.
226 See id. at 124-25.
227 See id. at 118-19.
228 See Graetz & Mashaw, note 35, at 70-72; Moss, note 26, at 188-89.
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These have each instead turned out to be vital legal and policy innova-
tions that have improved overall welfare enormously.229  This is not to
say that moral hazard is not a real concern; rather, it is just to say that
moral hazard can be managed so that the benefits of a program vastly
outweigh any costs.
3. Cross-Correlation and Tail Risk
A key assumption in this plan, as in any insurance, is that the RDF
will not have to pay out claims to every state in every year.  Those
having a good year help to pay the claims to those having a bad year,
and next year, perhaps the positions reverse.  This would help the
fund to remain solvent even as it makes payouts.  But there is a
chance that many, even most states, experience below-threshold reve-
nue in a given year.  Indeed, that outcome is likely for a national re-
cession or financial crisis, as in 2008.  When there is a nationwide
housing price drop, for example, nearly every state will feel the pinch.
But having the multistate RDF accumulate enough reserves to pay
out every state in a given year is not feasible.
This is potentially another avenue for federal involvement.  The
multistate RDF could aim to have sufficient reserves for most events,
but the federal government could take on the “tail risk” for the ex-
treme events.  Here an analogy to Value at Risk (VaR) is instructive.
Value at Risk is a tool used by financial institutions to measure the
lowest amount an investment portfolio would lose, say, 95% of the
time.230  If the RDF were required to maintain reserves to cover the
95% VaR, it would be adequate in most situations.  But 5% of the
time the payouts might exceed reserves and premiums, perhaps during
a severe national recession.  At those times, the federal government
could make up any shortfalls.
In this sense, the federal government would act essentially as a rein-
surer, taking on a certain slice of the risk held by the multistate RDF
(or really more like a re-reinsurer, since the RDF is itself re-insuring
some of the risk held by the state as an insurer of its resident).  The
RDF could even pay a partial premium to the federal government in
exchange for that risk, though if the RDF is investing its reserves in
Treasury bonds, paying a premium in addition could end up being just
229 See Moss, note 26, at 1.
230 See John R. Brooks II, Taxation, Risk, and Portfolio Choice:  The Treatment of Re-
turns to Risk Under a Normative Income Tax, 66 Tax L. Rev. 255, 280-83 (2013) (discuss-
ing Value at Risk).
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an accounting fiction.231  If not, then the federal absorption of tail risk
would act as an additional subsidy to the states, in addition to the
premium support discussed above.
4. Feasibility
At this point a reader would be forgiven for wondering whether this
is a rather complicated mechanism for doing something that could be
achieved largely by just having the federal government do the work
directly.  Raise federal rates, centralize the redistributive function of
government, limit states to property and similar residence-based
taxes, and so on—the standard fiscal federalism view with which that
this Article began.  A simple story, but likely even more politically
difficult.  While there is a strong moral and economic case for more
redistribution at the federal level, the national political process makes
that prospect doubtful.  And the discussion in Section IV.A suggests
that regardless of what level of redistribution the federal government
chooses, some states may wish to add to it.
As imagined here, the multistate RDF would be a quasi-public ar-
rangement of contracts and procedures to fill the gap left by the politi-
cal process, much in the same way that we use a highly regulated
mixture of private insurance companies, federal subsidies, and man-
dates in the individual health insurance market, rather than a single
public option.  In this case, we would be interposing a quasi-public
agency, the multistate RDF, between the state and federal govern-
ments, in order to facilitate a more optimal assignment of tax duties.
In particular, the multistate RDF could allow a subset of states to get
the benefits of some centralization, though still potentially at a subna-
tional level.
One question then is whether such an agency can be both insulated
enough from the political process and also open enough to not be fully
captured by state politicians looking for gain with no pain.  This comes
down to a question of political economy and public choice that is be-
yond this Article, which is more concerned with the thought experi-
ment of suggesting the possible operation of a multistate RDF.  That
said, there are some reasons to be hopeful.
While it is hard to imagine states cooperating in this manner, and
with enough federal involvement to make it work, there are significant
incentives for all parties to participate.  For the states, if they have a
positive expected return from the RDF, the rational choice is clear,
231 Indeed, the short-term bond rate is likely below the risk-free rate, implying a net
transfer from bond holders to the government.  See id. at 291-95; Yair Listokin, Taxation
and Liquidity, 120 Yale L.J. 1682, 1701-06 (2011).
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even if state politicians are not sufficiently risk-averse.  There may be
counter-productive resistance to the subsidization of poor and volatile
states, but the recent recession and crisis in state revenues could make
most states realize how precarious their fiscal positions are.  Further-
more, there are also already a number of interstate compacts, cover-
ing issues such as taxation,232 water rights,233 pollution and
environmental issues,234 fisheries,235 and children.236  States seem to
be able to cooperate when it is in their interests to do so.
From the federal government’s standpoint the motivation would be
to reduce the need for direct counter-cyclical support from the federal
government during economic downturns and to lower the chance of
procyclical cutbacks on state government programs and employment
during a downturn.  In the Great Recession, state government layoffs
were likely a major drag on the economy and overall levels of employ-
ment,237 which made the federal government’s macroeconomic stabili-
zation task more difficult.  Providing a protection against that
behavior is thus in the federal government’s interest—but likely not at
such a high cost that the subsidies end up costing more than a bail-out
would.
Finally, a program like this is somewhat consistent with localism
and the new federalism, in the sense that we would be asking states to
take on more of what had been largely a federal duty—redistribu-
tion—in part from a belief that some redistribution has a local charac-
ter.238  Thus, this program may be appealing even to right-leaning
policymakers who care about issues of federalism and subsidiarity.
Therefore, there is perhaps a path that could bring together the fed-
eral government, states with disparate interests and fiscal capacities,
and the opposing political parties.  But the stars would have to align
quite well.
232 E.g., Multistate Tax Comm’n, Multistate Tax Compact (1966); see Joseph F. Zimmer-
man, Interstate Cooperation: Compacts and Administrative Agreements 121-22 (2d ed.
2012).
233 E.g., Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 105-104,
111 Stat. 2219 (1997); Upper Colorado River Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 81-37, 63 Stat. 31
(1949); see Zimmerman, note 234, at 131-35.
234 E.g., Tri-State Compact, Pub. Res. No. 74-62, 49 Stat. 932 (1935); see Zimmerman,
note 234, at 137-41.
235 E.g., Potomac River Fisheries Compact, Pub. L. No. 87-783, 76 Stat. 797 (1962); see
Zimmerman, note 234, at 114-17.
236 E.g., Interstate Comm’n for Juveniles, Interstate Compact on Juveniles (1955); see
Zimmerman, note 234, at 117-18.
237 See note 12.
238 See notes 138-142 and accompanying text. [X]
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B. An Alternative Using Existing Programs
While an ideal multistate RDF with sufficient participation by the
states, federal subsidies and backstopping, adequate protections
against moral hazard, and public-interested management could serve a
valuable role, it may simply be asking too much for it all to come
together, and furthermore for the combined federal/state tax-and-
transfer system to rely so heavily on it.  But it may be that a series of
small changes elsewhere in the fiscal federalism system could roughly
mimic the key advantages of a multistate RDF.
In particular, some combination of expanded borrowing and deficit
spending by the states, subsidization and expansion of existing inde-
pendent state RDFs, partial fiscal equalization of the states by the fed-
eral government, and a more clearly defined role for federal bail-outs
of states could encompass a federal/state risk management scheme
that would have as many of, and perhaps more than, the benefits of a
multistate RDF.  Each element here has been written about and dis-
cussed in detail elsewhere, though typically as single proposals to ad-
dress a single problem or set of problems.  By comparing them instead
to the thought experiment of a multistate RDF, I argue that it is better
to think of them as a single risk management scheme, able to manage
the insurance and volatility risks of the combined federal/state redis-
tributive tax-and-transfer system.
1. State Borrowing and Deficit Spending
As noted in Section V.A, insurance is often a substitute for borrow-
ing.  If capital markets were perfect, and politicians acted purely in the
voters’ interests, one partial solution to the problems of volatility and
risk management would be to release states from the restrictions of
balanced budget requirements and borrowing limitations.  That would
shift some of the risk of revenue volatility onto creditors who, if they
were adequately diversified, could be well-equipped to absorb that
risk.  This would also avoid some of the moral hazard problems of a
multistate RDF, since the credit markets would presumably price risk
into the interest rate it demanded, meaning that a state could not shift
away all of the risk of revenue volatility.
This is unlikely to be a satisfactory solution alone, however.  First,
politicians are not selfless actors, and the fiscal limitations came into
being in the first place following a national crisis of state bad behav-
ior.239  While it may be salutary for states to increase spending above
revenue at times, David Super reminds us that another possible result
of repealing balanced budget requirements is cutting taxes below
239 See text accompanying note 82.
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spending, much as we have seen at the federal level since 1986.240
While there may be a fiscal-stimulus argument for such an action at
times, the general approach is likely to be contrary to the goal of ex-
panding redistribution.
Second, it is not clear that states would behave much differently
today if the rules were all repealed.  The rules themselves vary in
strength across states, with many quite weak.  Many states require
only that budgets be balanced, but not outlays, meaning that a state
could borrow if actual revenue dropped below expectations.241  Bor-
rowing for capital projects is generally unrestricted, and states make
use of that to fund operations.242  According to James Poterba, bal-
anced budget requirements apply to less than 75% of state spend-
ing.243  That leaves a substantial amount of room for possible deficit
spending, and it appears that states do not make the most use of it.  As
noted earlier, the stronger constraints on a state are likely a combina-
tion of the bond market and voters,244 neither of which would disap-
pear if balanced budget requirements and debt restrictions were
loosened.
David Super has suggested a partial loosening of the budget rules,
allowing for greater borrowing during economic downturns.245  Such a
change would involve a combination of loosened balanced budget re-
quirements—for example, allowing a legislature to pass an unbal-
anced budget during a recession—and also loosening of restrictions on
total debt outstanding.  Coupled with a change requiring states to pay
down the additional debt during strong economic periods, such a rule
could allow for at least partial counter-cyclical budget policy while
limiting the chances for bad behavior at other times.246 Whether bond
markets and voters would agree is an open question, however.  But at
the margin, it is likely that there would have been more borrowing
and deficit spending during the Great Recession had states felt more
able to do so.
240 See Super, note 6, at 2641-42.
241 According to Tracy Gordon, forty-four states require that governors submit balanced
budgets to the legislature, forty-one states require that legislatures pass balanced budgets,
and thirty-eight require that states not carry deficits over into the next fiscal year.  See
Gordon, note 71, at 249.
242 See Subsection III.B.1.
243 Poterba, note 80, at 331.
244 See Gamage, note 6, at 764-65; Gordon, note 78, at 249.
245 See Super, note 6, at 2642.
246 Preset triggers on budgets and debt limits would be similar in design to David
Gamage’s proposal for automatic adjustments in tax rates to deal with revenue shortfalls,
though Gamage rules out changes to borrowing rules because of the “nature of the politi-
cal process.”  Gamage, note 6, at 766; compare Super, note 6, at 2644-45, with Gamage,
note 6, at 806-08.
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2. Support for State RDFs
Assuming that state borrowing and deficit spending would not en-
tirely smooth out revenue volatility, states should continue to self-in-
sure through their independent RDFs.  Galle and Stark have
examined the role of state RDFs in detail and propose a set of reforms
to shore them up.  They suggest a combination of federal subsidies,
matching grants, and tax preferences; “lockboxes” to ensure RDF
withdrawals go to specific purposes; stricter rules for contributions
and withdrawals; and behavioral economics–influenced incentives to
try to combat short-term biases of politicians and voters.247
Broadly speaking, their proposals are valuable, though I would put
more emphasis on subsidies and matching grants, and less on stricter
rules for uses of funds.  The danger is that strict rules for uses of funds
may prove constraining, particularly when we cannot predict in what
form that next state fiscal crisis will come.  For example, the lockbox
approach would need to be sensitive to changes in risks and relative
prices over time.  If the next state fiscal crisis relates to, say, climate
change and extreme weather, it would be unfortunate if too much of
an RDF were dedicated to, say, supporting state worker pensions.
And even if state pensions were the right thing to spend on, lockbox
allocations based on wages and prices today may lead to over-  or
under-allocation when withdrawals are made years or decades into the
future.  Money is fungible, of course, but part of managing fiscal and
economic crises is having a flexible set of tools that can be adapted to
different purposes.  Furthermore, some states, such as New York, cur-
rently under-use their existing RDFs and budget stabilization funds
due to a concern about strict repayment rules and the like.  At any
rate, Galle and Stark fully explore the issues, and they need not be
repeated further here.
3. Equalization and Revenue Sharing
A major topic of fiscal federalism research largely left out of the
discussion thus far is the role of equalization payments.248  In a unitary
national system, the government can spend as it sees fit to account for
the regional differences in income, wealth, and economic resources
generally.  In a federal system, that discretion can be limited if some
of the government spending in a state is funded purely out of own-
source state revenue.  States vary drastically in their fiscal capaci-
247 See Galle & Stark, note 6, at 619-34.
248 For general discussion of equalization and revenue sharing, see Musgrave, note 1, at
182; Oates, Fiscal Federalism, note 1, at 65-95; Kirk J. Stark, Rich States, Poor States:
Assessing the Design and Effect of a U.S. Fiscal Equalization Regime, 63 Tax L. Rev. 957
passim (2010).
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ties,249 and thus even if Mississippi had an income tax system that
matched New York’s or California’s, it would still generate far less
revenue per capita.
The standard answer to this is to have equalization between the re-
gions, in the form of federal tax revenue from richer states funding
relatively more generous transfers to poorer states.  These tend to be a
feature of most federal systems,250 though there is relatively little in
the United States,251 despite the fact that we had a system of General
Revenue Sharing in the 1970’s and early 1980’s.252
The tax assignment question at the heart of this Article is generally
separate from the question of equalization.  Nonetheless, a system of
equalization could partially include federal reinsurance of the
states.253  For example, payments could be made a function not only of
factors like population and fiscal capacity, but also revenue shortfalls,
state unemployment rate, or other measures of relative economic per-
formance.254  In a sense, this is just a subset of the larger point that
federal spending can serve reinsurance goals.255
That said, it is also not clear how successful fiscal equalization has
been, either in the United States or in other countries.  There is some
evidence that large fiscal equalization payments can create a sort of
transfer dependency that inhibits the development of a region’s econ-
omy.  Fabio Padovano contrasts Italy, with large fiscal equalization
payments, and the United States, with relatively little, as telling exam-
ples.256  In Italy, the more economically backward regions have re-
mained so for decades, even centuries, while the United States has
249 See Stark, note 248, at 981-89.
250 See Wallace E. Oates, An Essay on Fiscal Federalism, 37 J. Econ. Literature 1120,
1127 (1999).
251 Federal transfers actually make up a large portion of state revenues.  See, e.g., Ur-
ban-Brookings Tax Pol’y Ctr., note 60, at 1.  The transfers are generally not related to fiscal
capacities, and therefore are largely not equalizing.  Stark, note 248, at 960.
252 See generally Wallin, note 91, at 6.
253 Boadway, note 198, at 370 (“[A] transfer system that equalizes fiscal capacities auto-
matically insures against temporary shocks to states’ tax bases as well as compensating for
permanent differences in fiscal capacity.”); Lockwood, note 216, at 2-3.
254 The federal government briefly tried something along these lines by using counter-
cyclical revenue sharing as part of its stimulus package in 1977.  See Edward M. Gramlich,
Stimulating the Macro Economy Through State and Local Governments, 69 Am. Econ.
Rev. 180, 180 (1979) (discussing the program).
255 See Oates, Second Generation, note 1, at 364-66 (discussing federal grants that incor-
porate “risk-sharing contracts”).
256 See Oates, note 124, at 324 (discussing Fabio Padovano, The Politics and Economics
of Regional Transfers:  Decentralization, Interregional Redistribution, and Income Con-
vergence (2007)); see also Fernando M. Aragon, Local Spending, Transfers, and Costly Tax
Collection, 66 Nat’l Tax J. 343, 343-44 (2013) (discussing the tendency of localities to in-
crease spending more due to an incremental increase in federal grants than to an incremen-
tal increase in local tax base, because the costs of raising the revenue are borne elsewhere).
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had somewhat more success in spreading development around the
country.257
Equalization is further complicated by the fact that one relatively
clear path to increasing equalization payments could cut into state-
level redistributive efforts.  In Section III.C, I noted that several of the
major combined federal-state redistributive programs, namely Medi-
caid and TANF, allow for state-level differences in generosity.  But
that fact also means that some funding must come from a state’s own
sources of revenue, which, again, differ widely.258  If Medicaid, TANF,
and other programs were entirely federal and based on a single, na-
tional eligibility formula, the programs would also play a stronger
equalization role—regions with proportionally more eligible individu-
als would receive proportionally greater payments, funded out of rev-
enue from richer regions.259
Thus one path to increasing equalization would also decrease state-
level redistribution.  That may in fact be a worthwhile trade-off, as-
suming no other changes.  But assuming that the hypothetical national
Medicaid eligibility formula would roughly track the median voter’s
preferences, we would still have the case of some states wanting to
supplement national redistributive efforts.260  This could mean that
the risk-shifting benefits of more equalization could be muted, and
thus that it would likely not be able to play the reinsurance role alone.
4. Federal Bailouts
In Subsection V.A.3, I argued that a successful multistate RDF
would likely still need federal backstopping and absorption of tail risk.
However, to be clear, there is already a large amount of federal rein-
surance of states and the individuals in a state.  This takes a number of
different forms.  The federal government now provides substantial dis-
aster aid, mortgage relief, deposit insurance, and other programs that
are aimed in part at regionally-based income shocks.261  In addition,
the federal government made a number of ad hoc actions during the
257 See Oates, note 124, at 325.
258 The Medicaid FMAP formula appears to be intended to allow for equalization
through disproportionate payments to poorer states.  See note 99 and accompanying text.
Yet the fact that states have to partially fund the programs out of their own-source revenue
largely wipes out any equalizing effect of the FMAP formula.  See Stark, note 248, at 992-
93.
259 Social Security operates somewhat in this way now.  Because the payments are highly
progressive, see 42 U.S.C. § 415 (2012) (outlining computation of Social Security Primary
Insurance Amount), the poorer elderly—and thus regions with greater proportions of poor
elderly—receive disproportionate payments.
260 See Subsection IV.A.2.
261 See Moss, note 26, at 1-2.
2014] FISCAL FEDERALISM AS RISK-SHARING 141
Great Recession and in other recessions that can provide a model for
future bail-outs, such as a payroll tax holiday,262 extension of unem-
ployment insurance,263 and deferral of payments for Medicaid and
other matching grant programs (essentially loaning money to the
states to help them make up their portion of matching grant
payments).264
Independent state RDFs, though still underfunded, could work bet-
ter if coordinated with more explicit federal absorption of tail risk.  As
discussed above,265 part of the problem with self-insuring is that one
loses the advantage of lowering volatility through increasing the size
of the risk pool.  And ultimately volatility is about tail risk—the aver-
age loss does not change as the risk pool increases, only the variance
in the distribution of possible losses.  If the federal government took
on more tail risk explicitly, that would serve a similar, though less
ideal, way of avoiding extreme losses.
The difficulty is that federal bail-outs are subject to politics, and as
we saw during the Great Recession, there is a risk of inadequate help
to the states.  In a tight revenue environment, there can be substantial
political headwinds against increasing spending, and so reliance on fu-
ture federal aid is unlikely to be of great comfort to states.  A state
considering expanding its income tax would likely want greater assur-
ance of protection against downside risk through clearly defined rules
for when and in what amounts bail-outs will occur.
The danger, of course, is that more explicit ex ante codification of
the federal bail-outs roll risks the same sort of moral hazard problems
discussed in connection with a multistate RDF.  If you tell states what
to do to get money, they are likely to do just that.
The larger point, however, is that viewed through the lens of insur-
ance and risk-pooling, federal bail-outs in recessions are not unfortu-
nate responses to state fiscal weakness, but may be features of an
appropriate allocation of risk.  Reinsuring tail risk is often the most
prudent approach in risk management, particularly where the rein-
surer is large enough and adequately capitalized to absorb that risk.266
In that sense there is no better reinsurer than the federal government.
262 Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of
2010, Pub. L. No. 111-312, § 601, 124 Stat. 3296, 3297.
263 Unemployment Compensation Extension Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-449, 122 Stat.
5014.
264 See Super, note 6, at 2611-12 (discussing Medicaid waivers).
265 See Section V.A.
266 See, e.g., Raim & Langford, note 186, at 40-16 (“Facultative reinsurance is commonly
purchased for large, unusual or catastrophic risks.”).
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VI. CONCLUSION
The basic lesson of fiscal federalism is to have each level of govern-
ment in a federal system focus on those duties that it can provide most
effectively.  With respect to the assignment of tax duties, the standard
view is that a state cannot effectively perform redistribution and pro-
gressive income taxation since the costs are simply too high.  But the
standard view has largely misidentified the costs, or at least their mag-
nitude.  The relevant costs, at least within the range of plausible cur-
rent policies, are not from tax migration and crippling state tax
competition as a result of redistributive policies, but rather from poor
risk management—suboptimal insurance against income shocks, both
for states and their residents.
With this view of the costs in focus, a different solution than simply
trying to wean states off their progressive income taxes becomes clear.
If we can create alternative mechanisms for risk pooling and sharing
through insurance, then we can allow states the room to employ the
redistributive policies that, for normative reasons, they should be
employing.
This Article suggests several possibilities for nationalizing the insur-
ance function of progressive income taxation.  The purest answer to a
problem of risk mitigation is insurance—here, conceived of as a multi-
state RDF.  But that is not the only option, and a combination of re-
forms to state borrowing, state RDFs, federal revenue sharing, and
federal bail-outs could provide much the same benefits.  These op-
tions themselves are not new, but the discussion of them within the
framework of managing the risk of otherwise-desirable state redistrib-
utive programs is.  By separating the redistributive function of a pro-
gressive income tax from the insurance function, we can see each of
these policy options not as particular policies to solve particular
problems, but rather as parts of an overall federal/state risk manage-
ment scheme.
Ultimately, redistribution is a central goal of tax policy, at the state
level no less than the federal level, and seeking out new and effective
ways to accomplish that task in light of growing income inequality
should be central to tax reform efforts.  States have stepped into the
breach in recent decades—sometimes by choice, sometimes not—but
they have thus far paid a heavy price, lacking an ability to manage
business cycle revenue swings well.  Rather than pushing states to
scale back their redistributive efforts, we should be seeking ways to
support them, and for them to support themselves.
